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Notes from the Editor 
 
In this issue of Homeland Security Affairs we offer one essay that outlines some 
of the important homeland security issues of 2008 and a set of essays that 
describes a potentially significant change in the national homeland security 
architecture. This edition also has two essays about homeland security 
technology.  One applies coevolutionary theory to the strategic question of how to 
defend against an adaptive adversary; the other discusses policy and technology 
changes that could improve aviation safety. We present an article that 
demonstrates how to determine the benefits and costs of homeland security 
spending and an article that discusses threats from China to American 
corporations and to homeland security. The issue concludes with an analysis of 
how Community Health Centers can be an integral part of the nation’s public 
health preparedness. 
In our second annual “Changing Homeland Security: Year in Review – 2008” 
Christopher Bellavita reports on what a selected group of homeland security 
professionals considered 2008’s top stories. Their survey responses included the 
presidential election and its impact on homeland security, the terrorist attack in 
Mumbai, the domestic and international economic meltdown, chaos on the 
southern border, the continued quest to define homeland security, and an 
expanding threat spectrum. Bellavita also includes three candidates for the 
“Homeland Security Image of the Year.” 
Should the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and the National Security 
Council (NSC) merge?  As we prepare to publish, most signs indicate the merger 
will take place. Christine E. Wormuth and Jeremy White present the argument in 
support of the merger. In “Merging the HSC and NSC: Stronger Together,” the 
authors note that at the federal level homeland security is essentially an 
interagency activity. White House leadership is the only practical way to ensure 
unity of effort among federal agencies. Merging the NSC and the HSC into one 
organization can end the bifurcation of national security and homeland security.  
A single council will give the president a way to develop and implement 
homeland security policy that is integrated with other national security 
initiatives. 
Paul N. Stockton, in “Beyond the HSC/NSC Merger: Integrating States and 
Localities into Homeland Security Policymaking,” agrees that merging the NSC 
and the HSC seems inevitable. But the change brings risk. Stockton argues that if 
the councils are combined, administration officials will need to pay special 
attention to a number of issues, including the danger that homeland security will 
take a back seat to traditional national security priorities. The president and the 
newly structured council will also need to address significant challenges of 
horizontal integration (i.e., across federal agencies) and vertical integration – the 
inclusion of state and local representatives in the work of the council. Stockton 
reviews the possible problems with a merger and suggests solutions. 
In “Technology Strategies for Homeland Security: Adaptation and Coevolution 
of Offense and Defense,” Brian A. Jackson frames the dynamic between terrorist 
groups and security forces as a coevolutionary process. Highlighting the use of 
technology by both homeland security organizations and terrorists, Jackson 
describes how terrorists adapt to defensive technologies and how homeland 
security organizations must then develop measures to counter those adaptations.  
He argues that trying to create impenetrable defenses for every target is futile.  
Instead he suggests that defensive technology strategies should exploit 
evolutionary dynamics by shaping adversary choices and by using defensive 
approaches that are insensitive to terrorist adaptation strategies. 
Anthony M. Fainberg’s essay, “The Terrorist Threat to Inbound U.S. Passenger 
Flights: Inadequate Government Response,” illustrates the interface between 
technology, politics, and security. He writes that the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) seems reluctant to focus on security for aircraft flying into 
the United Sates from abroad. Reviewing the decades-long history of terrorist 
attacks on commercial aviation, Fainberg notes how al Qaeda has tried more than 
once to simultaneously destroy several U.S. aircraft, in flight, by using suicide 
bombers ticketed as regular passengers. He argues that countries from which 
inbound flights depart should agree to security standards that match those 
applied to domestic flights, including using explosive trace detectors to inspect 
passengers and their carry-on items. 
In “Just How Much Does That Cost, Anyway? An Analysis of the Financial 
Costs and Benefits of the ‘No Fly’ List,” Marcus Holmes offers a unique financial 
cost and security benefit analysis of the United States government’s “no fly list.” 
On September 11, 2001 the no fly list contained sixteen names of terrorists and 
other individuals deemed threatening to the states. Since then, the list has had 
more than 755,500 names. Holmes writes that while there has been considerable 
interest in the social costs of the list, there has been little attention paid to the 
financial costs relative to the benefits. He claims it is unclear how one can create a 
strategy for how national security dollars should be spent without knowing how 
many dollars are involved and where they are going. Holmes’ study is a path-
setting step in asking and answering an important question: what are the costs, 
relative to the benefits, of anti-terrorism policies and security strategies?  
Robert C. Slate is the author of “Innovating with Intelligence: New Directions 
in China’s Quest for Intangible Property and Implications for Homeland 
Security.” He argues Chinese corporations that use intellectual property theft and 
infringement in their business model are significant threats to the intangible 
property of the American corporate world and pose a serious threat to homeland 
security. Slate describes how Chinese corporations, universities, and research 
institutions use intelligence principles to help China become an economic 
superpower. He calls for the U.S. intelligence community to rethink its traditional 
approach to collecting and analyzing information about China.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 outlines a new approach to public 
health and medical preparedness in the United States. In “Community Health 
Centers: The Untapped Resource for Public Health and Medical Preparedness,” 
Karen M. Wood writes that the more than 1,200 community health centers (CHC) 
in the nation are well-positioned to play a significant role in that effort. Wood 
describes how CHCs can improve biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, 
mass casualty care, and community resilience. She argues that aggressive 
investment in the centers and their emergency management programs can make 
public health emergency management more accessible to special-needs 
populations and support many of the objectives identified in HSPD 21.   
We hope you find the articles in this issue of Homeland Security Affairs 
informative and thought provoking. As always, we invite you to contribute your 
own research and ideas to the continuing conversation about homeland security. 
 
The Editor 
 In Memoriam: Matthew Simeone 
Legacy Beyond Nassau 
 
Richard B. Cooper 
 
 
One of the greatest rewards in life is the people you meet and the things they teach you 
along the way. I have been more than fortunate throughout my career to work with 
some amazing people. They have ranged from gifted engineers and scientists who have 
built technologies and programs to improve life on earth to leaders and innovators who 
have made tremendous differences (large and small) to the every day lives of people and 
communities in which they live. 
On March 27, 2009 one of those amazing people passed away.  His name was Matt 
Simeone.   
I first met Matt in 2004 during a business trip to the greater New York City area 
when I was working for DHS’ Private Sector Office. At the time, Matt and several of his 
fellow officers in the Nassau County Police Department were building one of the 
country’s first public-private sector information sharing networks. It was called the 
Security/Police Information Network (SPIN) and it was Matt’s job to lead the team of 
police officers to put the program in place. 
While Matt may have spent his entire career as a police officer serving the people of 
Long Island on patrol, combating gangs, serving as a police academy instructor, and 
more, he understood that any effective information sharing network in a post 9/11 world 
had to do more than just talk to cops. It had to talk to businesses, and community and 
civic associations, as well as citizens in the community. Such a network also had to have 
relevant and timely information being exchanged as expeditiously as possible.   
Most importantly, Matt and his colleagues knew that their network had to be a two-
way street of give and take between its various users, while allowing for other outside 
avenues (other law enforcement agencies; regional groups, etc.) to connect into it should 
a need or emergency arise. To Matt and his SPIN team, everyone had to get the 
information they needed to do their respective jobs. 
In applying the principles of community policing to create this first-of-its-type tool 
for Nassau County, Matt and his team did something very novel in building their 
information sharing network. They actually went out and listened to the very 
constituencies they wanted to engage.   
Rather than simply create the requirements for SPIN on a white board at police 
headquarters, build it and impose it upon others, Matt and his team engaged business 
interests, civic groups, and community stakeholders throughout Nassau County and the 
surrounding areas to forge their information sharing network. While building that 
network, something else happened along the way. A newfound sense of trust, respect, 
and relationships developed amongst the diverse stakeholders with the Nassau County 
Police Department; that allowed the SPIN program to generate success almost from the 
beginning of its operations.  
Matt’s collaborative leadership style – always end-goal focused and believing in 
person-to-person contact – was a perfect match for an inventive and dynamic 
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information system. He also understood that while the 9/11 attacks that claimed many 
of his County’s residents occurred just west of Nassau in lower Manhattan, there was 
still an inherent role and responsibility for his police department to be ready for that 
scale of emergency, as well as the smaller scale ones that occur every day in the form of 
violent crime, robberies and so forth.   
He recognized that key to any successful homeland security operation was having 
effective and informed relationships. Those were established by effective information 
sharing where each user could take shared details and react and respond accordingly.  
Matt wanted to be sure Nassau County was ready with such a resource. 
He succeeded. 
Two weeks ago in a congressional hearing, Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA) spoke about 
the need for DHS’ Information and Analysis efforts to be led by someone with real state 
and local law enforcement experience. Someone who (in her words) could directly speak 
to the needs of “front-line first responders” when it came to information sharing and 
more.   
I couldn’t help but think of Matt when she made those remarks. For me, Matt 
Simeone was the model of the leader she spoke of and all anyone had to do was look at 
what’s in place and operating in Nassau County today to see the proof. 
Matt’s passing as a result of cancer robs his family of a dear loved one, but further 
robs the nation and his community of his continued leadership on information sharing 
and other issues. His legacy of service, though, will continue to serve his community on 
Long Island, his ‘own homeland,’ and more for years to come. 
That’s a metric of which any person can be proud. To those of us who mourn his loss, 
it is a metric that we should all continue to aspire to fulfill. That’s what Matt’s life of 
service taught us and it is just one of the lessons he would want us to carry forward for 
Nassau County and beyond. 
 
Inspector Matthew Simeone graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security in the fall of 2007, where he served as 
co-president of cohort 0601-0602. To learn more about Matt’s work with SPIN, see 
the profile in the June 2006 issue of Security Management Magazine, available at 
www.securitymanagement.com.   
  
Richard “Rich” Cooper is a partner with Catalyst Partners, LLC (formerly known as Olive, 
Edwards & Cooper, LLC), a government and public affairs practice in Washington, DC that 
focuses on homeland and national security matters. He also serves as the vice chairman of the 
Homeland Security Division of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA); as a 
member of the American National Standards Institute’s Homeland Security Standards Panel 
(ANSI-HSSP); and as an advisor to the Reform Institute and New York University’s 
International Center for Enterprise Preparedness (InterCEP). He previously served as 
business liaison director for science and technology and preparedness at the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security’s Private Sector Office.  He can be reached at rcooper@catalystdc.com.  
 
 








A Social Infrastructure for Hometown Security:  Advancing the 
Homeland Security Paradigm 
 
Robert Bach and David J. Kaufman 
 
 
The United States, through a concerted national effort that galvanizes the strengths 
and capabilities of Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments; the private and non-
profit sectors; and regions, communities, and individual citizens – along with our 
partners in the international community – will work to achieve a secure Homeland 
that sustains our way of life as a free, prosperous, and welcoming America. 
-- Vision Statement, 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security1 
 
The nation’s homeland security strategy calls on federal, state, and local governments, 
businesses, communities, and individuals across the country to work together to achieve 
a shared vision of a secure way of life. Yet for over seven years, through attacks, threats, 
and disasters, the core ingredient in efforts to achieve that goal remains elusive.2 The 
American public has been left out and is largely missing in action. 
This elusiveness persists because of a misdiagnosis of the way the American people 
experience homeland security practices, inappropriate application of border screening 
and verification techniques to domestic public life, and an incomplete strategic 
preparedness framework that relies excessively on top-down federal management. This 
article argues for a new approach that engages the American people in ways that invites 
their participation in understanding, assessing, and mitigating risk. New community-
oriented techniques are needed that draw heavily on community policing models and 
public health philosophies; the federal government needs to invert its strategic planning 
and funding processes, seize the moment and leverage the restructuring of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other priorities as opportunities to put 
communities first. The new administration has issued a national call to service. This call 
offers an opportunity to invest in a social infrastructure for homeland security that will 
bring the American people fully into strengthening their own preparedness. 
ELUSIVE PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT 
The nation’s leaders often acknowledge a critical role for the American public in 
homeland security, but how to achieve it has proven elusive. Just two months after the 
9/11 attacks, for instance, President Bush called on Americans “to serve by bettering our 
communities and, thereby, defy and defeat the terrorists.”3 A few years later, Homeland 
Security Secretary Tom Ridge, reiterated the call: “President Bush has said, ‘The true 
strength of the country lies in the hearts and souls of our citizens.’ He is absolutely right. 
The federal government cannot micro-manage the protection of America. Instead, 
homeland security must become a priority in every city, every neighborhood, every 
home, and with every citizen.”4  
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Yet after Hurricane Katrina it became clear that many Americans were unprepared 
and uninvolved. The White House’s own after action report pointedly advised that “[w]e 
as a Nation - Federal, State, and local governments; the private sector; as well as 
communities and individual citizens – have not developed a shared vision of or 
commitment to preparedness... Without a shared vision … we will not achieve a truly 
transformational national state of preparedness.”5   
The urgency to overcome this missing link is clear. Yet misdiagnosis of the problem 
obstructs urgent action. The problem is not, as many emergency managers and security 
officials lament, the emergence of a “nanny society” that thrives on a general 
atmosphere of dependence on government aid that has eliminated individuals’ abilities 
and willingness to seek opportunities and accept responsibilities. Forced into a nanny 
role, the argument goes, federal and state officials must repeatedly remind local 
residents that they are “on their own” for seventy-two to ninety-six hours before the 
government can reach them and provide assistance.   
Rather, government officials and the public fundamentally misunderstand and 
mistrust each other. The American public, for instance, is much more interested in 
preparing for emergencies than government officials believe. Recent polling shows that 
a large majority of Americans nationwide have paid attention and gained information 
about terrorist threats.6 The problem is that they do not fully trust the government to 
inform them correctly or to deliver on its promises. They also do not know what to do to 
prepare effectively, having been told simply to live their normal lives7 and prepare 
individual ready kits;8 advice that provides little confidence of protection in the face of 
large and uncertain risks. Most importantly, though, research suggests that the reasons 
why people do not behave the way government plans expect them to is that local 
residents and communities do not hold the views and expectations that government 
planners believe they do. In short, government planners are out of touch with local 
residents. They are ill-informed about the very public they lament does not care or listen 
to their instructions.9 
Lack of trust, perceived misplaced investments, repeated alerts to risks that are not 
explained, and bungled emergency responses have created a deep division between 
federal government strategies and the willingness of the American public to embrace 
them. Even federal emergency officials accept this condition. Former FEMA 
Administrator Paulison, for instance, blamed the agency’s response to Katrina for a 
current lack of public confidence and admits that it will be difficult to earn the public’s 
trust. “I don't know if people are going to believe what I tell them,” he says, “and maybe 
they shouldn't."10 
As candidate for president, then Senator Obama pushed hard for the need to 
overcome this division, issuing a call for the American public “to step into the strong 
current of history”11 He chastised previous efforts that failed to mobilize communities 
across the land. Referring to Americans’ readiness to serve after the 9/11 attacks, he 
said, “We were ready…to answer a new call for our country, but the call never came.”  
“Instead of a call to service, we were asked to go shopping.”12 
By most accounts, the likely security challenges in the next few years will demand 
much greater involvement of the public, not only to sustain public support for large-
scale funding, but more importantly, because the public will be crucial to greater 
effectiveness in preventing and responding to these threats. The treacherous currents 
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ahead include homegrown terrorism and domestic radicalization; and as a recent 
bipartisan congressional report on future threats emphasized, pandemic illness, 
whether natural or manmade, poses an almost certain threat in the next few years.13 
Difficult crosscurrents ahead will also require emergency response and recovery 
strategies that do not depend on large-scale federal deployments ahead of every 
threatening storm. Effectiveness in each situation will fall as much (if not more) on the 
capacities of local communities, neighbors, and families, than on federal response teams 
and billions of dollars of new equipment. The challenge is to understand how to engage 
the public collectively and on a large scale across the nation to build this capacity.   
TRANSFORMING THE MISSION  
A first step in transforming homeland security strategy is to recognize that current 
efforts undermine preparedness every bit as much as they support it. Paradoxically, the 
successes of government initiatives in the last few years – and there have been many – 
have also made more evident and urgent the need to reach well beyond top-down 
governmental approaches. Progress in developing a “national management system,” 
emanating from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has also decreased the 
participation of a broad range of joint decision-makers in communities across the 
country. Community engagement has been left to become a ‘nice thing to do;’ rather 
than to take its proper place as the cornerstone of effective security.14 
After 9/11, the nation’s homeland security strategy focused heavily on governmental 
initiatives, primarily at the federal level, to improve information and intelligence 
sharing, screen persons and cargos entering the United States, harden critical assets, 
and improve government response capabilities. As is often noted, these initiatives 
launched the largest growth in the federal bureaucracy since World War II, founding 
entirely new mammoth agencies such as the Transportation Security Administration, 
DHS, U.S. Northern Command, and the Office of the Director for National Intelligence. 
All were designed to ensure the internal security of the U.S. homeland and to prosecute 
a “global war on terror” abroad. But they also involved top-down management systems 
and military-style command and control strategies in planning and implementation, 
often focusing on a doctrine of offense and preemption. As President Bush stated in his 
September 20, 2001 address to a joint session of Congress, “We will take defensive 
measures against terrorism to protect Americans....These measures are essential.  But 
the only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, 
and destroy it where it grows.”15  
Misapplied Border Security Strategies 
These largely impressive efforts to stand-up a new federal bureaucracy, however, have 
created a vast divide between a homeland security enterprise, with all the power and 
wealth of large government and corporate engagement, and the experiences of the 
American public. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the way security measures have 
been implemented at our nation’s borders and within the United States. The current 
homeland security paradigm’s offensive and defensive strategies converge at the 
nation’s borders in a layered system-of-systems approach to screening and verification 
of all things deemed a potential risk. The strategy and its tools promote early detection 
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of potential threats, allowing time to analyze them and respond before reaching U.S. 
shores, and providing repeated opportunities to catch threats that successfully avoid an 
earlier screen. This strategy works well at the border where – starting with forward 
deployment overseas – the layered system of surveillance, screening, and analysis 
monitors and approves shipping, cargo, and people attempting to breach the nation’s 
perimeter. Under the circumstances, the strategy also optimizes efficiencies; as former 
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Admiral James Loy has described it, the 
approach does not “look for a needle in a haystack, but lifts the hay from the needle.”16 
However, as it has been applied to the American public – individuals and 
communities inside the United States – this screening, verification, and approval 
approach is in conflict with a core value and faith of American democracy: the 
presumption of innocence. Subjecting Americans to numerous screening activities, as 
has become normal behavior at airports, is not necessarily the problem. Nor is increased 
use of new intrusive technology, much of which could be made more compatible with 
civil liberties and privacy protections. Rather, discarding the presumption of innocence, 
even if unintentionally, is what does damage to public trust and engagement in 
homeland security. Walking through a public airport, for instance, does not in itself 
evoke particular privacy rights. But an individual does have a strong expectation that, in 
behaving normally, he or she is not considered a risk and therefore presumed guilty 
until screened. 
Applying border strategies to the interior of the United States, as currently practiced, 
undermines the willingness of Americans to work with a government that has de facto 
raised questions about their trustworthiness. These strategies focus on passivity, not 
engagement, on technical expertise rather than public understanding, and on classified 
information rather than on transparency. This approach makes Americans more 
dependent on governmental protection, ceding their own personal security to 
bureaucratic skillfulness. In a real sense, the current homeland security strategy creates 
the very dependence on government and the feelings of powerlessness that officials then 
misdiagnose as complacency, apathy, and denial. Feeling at risk in everyday, normal 
behavior runs counter to the commonsense vision of what Americans believe is a secure 
homeland. And, as administration officials observed after Hurricane Katrina, without 
such a vision the nation will not be prepared. 
Engaging the Citizenry 
The way around this conundrum is not to abandon all screening, but to have citizens 
fully aware and engaged in why and how the screening and surveillance occurs. This 
calls for new approaches – not borrowed from border screening and surveillance, but 
ones that turn to community involvement and civic engagement for the skills needed to 
secure the homeland. Unfortunately, all that Americans have been offered is generalized 
information and abstract advice through web sites and marketing campaigns (e.g., 
www.Ready.gov) and an underfunded suite of programs aimed at increasing volunteer 
action that have reached, at best, one percent of local residents. Americans have not 
been engaged in the kind of joint decision-making and cooperative planning for 
homeland security that fully engages local communities. 
Top-down national management initiatives and frameworks weaken the nation’s 
preparedness and communities’ safety because they do not generate action among those 
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who must perform well for the security effort to succeed. Fortunately, we can learn from 
other experiences in the nation’s history. As a nation, for instance, we have rethought 
our approach to public safety to meet similar challenges. Over a twenty year period, 
community-oriented policing transformed a top-down enforcement strategy into an 
engagement-based model for public safety. The field of public health offers similar 
guidance. A vision of good health is not simply limited to highly skilled professionals 
responding to disease and does not only depend on the capabilities of government 
agencies employing the most advanced technology and techniques, although these are 
advantageous; public health relies on the willingness and success of healthy Americans 
to prevent illness through changed behaviors, greater knowledge, and acceptance of 
what is required of them. The Institute of Medicine embodies this approach in its very 
definition of public health: “what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the 
conditions for people to be healthy.”17 
The homeland security challenge for the new administration is to find ways to 
transform a government-defined mission into a societal norm. Achieving this norm, and 
a greater level of resiliency as a nation, calls for more than recognition of the problem 
and certainly more than rhetorical references to citizen and community preparedness. 
Taking a cue from public health and other disciplines more engaged with the American 
public, we must mobilize and focus on what we, as a society, can do collectively to 
ensure our safety and security. 
A NEW HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM 
A new strategy for securing the nation begins with engaging the American people in 
their local communities. Recent nationwide polling confirms that most Americans 
continue to think poorly of their government overall:  when asked to assess government 
performance, only one in four rates the federal government positively.18 Yet when the 
public comes into direct contact with federal employees doing their jobs, the approval 
rate increases sharply.19 
Homeland security planners, professionals, and officials need to get out of their 
operations centers and office buildings and onto the street to work with Americans in 
ensuring our collective security. Priority initiatives need to focus on collective and 
connected activities in local communities. A new vision needs to be generated from and 
shared among local residents, businesses, and the various levels of government. It needs 
to be a vision that is defined by what we can do collectively to provide a desirable level of 
well-being, including safety, security, and peace. The American public must have the 
chance to ponder the tough choices, not just be the passive recipients of bad ones. 
Such a community-oriented approach to public security will generate an array of new 
initiatives and redirect and strengthen existing programs. The following examples offer 
strategies to engage local communities fully in both planning and decision-making, and 
to build institutional partnerships that embrace and promote those new relationships. 
A New, Joint Decision-Making Process 
Perhaps the most critical first step is to find ways to overcome Americans’ doubt and 
suspicion about the nature of the security challenge, including a realistic assessment of 
threats. Dependence and passivity result from continuously asking the American public 
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to have faith in institutions that they have learned to suspect and which they believe 
have failed them. 
• Dialog with the public about the risks we face and the actions we can 
take. The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for the application of a 
risk-based framework across all homeland security efforts to identify and assess 
potential hazards, determine levels of acceptable relative risk, and prioritize and 
allocate resources among homeland security partners. Despite widespread 
recognition of the value of such an effort, no inclusive, easily accessible, and 
repeatable process exists for evaluating risks and for using that information to shape 
decision-making. Communicating risk information also needs to encourage local 
decision-making rather than merely shaping grant applications for federal funds.  
Sharing national risk assessments in an appropriate form with businesses and the 
public should encourage and enable organizations, individuals, and communities to 
engage in providing for their own security.   
 The United Kingdom conducts and shares a risk assessment annually, combining 
national, regional, and local results. It publishes a National Risk Register designed 
to “encourage public debate on security and help organisations, individuals, families 
and communities, who want to do so, to prepare for emergencies.”20 The conduct of 
such assessments nationally and at state and local levels, and the sharing of 
information on identified risks through public discourse and in town hall and 
community meetings by public officials, is a critical first step to engaging the public 
in the homeland security mission.   
• Include local communities as joint decision-makers. Although the new 
administration’s agenda clearly calls for renewed collaboration between the federal 
government and state governors, even a reinvigorated liaison function will not 
transform the nature of decision-making. Across a range of issues, from investments 
to setting priorities, local communities should be real partners in making security-
related decisions. The Urban Areas Security Initiative and, in general, the federal 
grants process, offers a framework for financial assistance to be reorganized to 
include joint decision-making that involves local communities. For example, priority 
could be given to local alliances (including government agencies) that establish 
direct connections among various sectors and groups in local areas. 
  In other areas of social policy a variety of planning and funding mechanisms have 
emerged that combine federal, state, and local needs and interests. In workforce 
training, for instance, Workforce Investment Boards bring together private 
employers, job training providers, and local governments to set priorities and 
distribute funds. For certain needs, the federal government or state governments 
could directly fund common-purpose projects, providing local communities with 
resources through mechanisms similar to the long-standing Community 
Development Block Grants.   
  Focusing on local involvement in joint decision-making could also mobilize and 
leverage the resources of local residents who routinely contribute to projects through 
community foundations. Few of these foundations currently focus on preparedness 
projects, though some offer disaster relief assistance. Safety and security-oriented 
projects that more closely connect with the involvement of local residents could 
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significantly enhance participation and spread it among all subgroups in the local 
population. 
• Seize on FEMA regionalization plans to recalibrate and reorganize the 
relationship between DHS and local communities. Current efforts to bolster 
FEMA regions as intermediaries between the federal, state, tribal, and local 
governments respond in part to the need to engage in new forms of joint decision-
making. An opportunity exists to transform these regional activities from “federal 
monitors” and hierarchical intermediaries to catalysts for a broad network of multi-
sector community partners. DHS should restart and invert its annual preparedness 
strategic planning process. Federal initiatives need to seek out and understand local 
and state risks and priorities, and clearly identify and distinguish truly national 
needs that require federal action from the vast array of capacities and authorities 
that rest in the hands of state and local governments and communities. Drawing on 
new forms of inter-sector collaboration that emphasize horizontal, shared interests, 
and authorities, FEMA regional efforts could lead this effort, becoming promoters of 
community-oriented security initiatives rather than federal outreach managers who 
enhance programs designed and controlled by the Department of Homeland 
Security.21    
• Establish a National Institute of Preparedness. The new administration’s 
agenda promises to take a research-based approach to good public policymaking. 
Although the DHS Science and Technology Directorate has led the way in testing 
new technologies and techniques, a broader independent agency is needed to 
promote a science of preparedness, especially in terms of the complexities of 
community involvement. This initiative could resemble the National Institute of 
Justice, housed within the Department of Justice, or could be established as a new 
independent agency similar to the National Institute of Health. Each of these entities 
is known for its independent research and evaluation of long-term issues of social 
and health policy and for putting rigorous scientific debate and demonstration ahead 
of short-term policy imperatives. 
  The goal would be to develop, test, and support initiatives among clusters of local 
and regional public, private and non-governmental groups aimed at increasing the 
effectiveness of preparedness activities. Establishing a National Institute of 
Preparedness would create a vibrant national research program aimed at finding 
good strategies and truly assessing the extent to which the nation’s residents are 
prepared to prevent and protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist 
attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies.   
Leading from the Front 
A clear weakness resulting from the federal government-led homeland security strategy 
has been its failure to appreciate and capitalize on local law enforcement agencies in 
support of the homeland security mission. In its report, Leading from the Front, the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police reminded the federal administration that 
the foundation of policing in America, whether dealing with crime or terrorism, is 
deeply rooted in local law enforcement agencies, where the trust of the American people 
has had to be direct and sustained.22   
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Unfortunately, the nation currently faces a potential schism between federal 
homeland security initiatives and local law enforcement communities over both funding 
and purpose. As Los Angeles Police Chief William Bratton has described,23 many local 
communities perceive that terrorist threats may be overblown, creating more fear than 
safety. Local police may also be using limited resources unnecessarily and 
inappropriately to monitor law-abiding citizens. At the same time, traditional crime 
continues to rise, transnational drug cartels and gangs are consolidating their presence 
in both rural and urban communities, and, ironically, the potential for these criminal 
activities and groups to help support terrorism is increasing. 
The new administration needs to act aggressively and quickly to prevent a 
counterproductive schism from further undermining public support for homeland 
security initiatives. While senior police officials have expressed concerns about the 
crime-fighting blind spots that domestic security efforts may have created, the nation’s 
homeland security leaders have cautioned against using domestic security programs to 
help pay for day-to-day policing needs. “I don't think we want to take a program 
designed for one purpose and slowly massage it into another purpose,” former DHS 
Secretary Chertoff has said. “If you are pursuing street crime, I don't think all the organs 
of national security should be involved in that.”24 
The problem is that this schism will weaken the nation’s capacity to identify and 
prevent domestic terrorism and radicalization, two of the most important threats facing 
the country in the next few years. Simultaneously, it will also weaken the advances that 
local police departments have made in working with communities to counter other 
public insecurities. A federal-local schism is unnecessary. As various observers have 
argued, the purpose, advantages, and benefits of a community-policing approach to 
local law enforcement are well suited to preventing and responding to terrorist 
activity.25 Local law enforcement officers are far more likely to come into contact with 
those who may be directly or indirectly involved in terrorist activities than any federal 
official, and most certainly will be among the first responders to any future attack. For 
example, in 2005, in Torrance, California, local police arrested two men for robbing a 
gas station – and wound up uncovering a militant plot to attack Los Angeles-area 
synagogues and military installations. Good police work is good counterterrorism.26 
The community-policing approach employed by local law enforcement agencies offers 
several specific advantages in overcoming the deep divide between the federal homeland 
security strategy and public support and engagement.   
• Improved information sharing. Community policing offers a different 
approach to information sharing and surveillance than the top-down, federal-led 
efforts to screen and monitor local activities and verify the innocence of everyday 
American citizens. Although counterterrorism activities differ in some crucial ways 
from crime prevention, the philosophy of community policing encourages innovation 
in engaging local communities, defining problems, and sustaining connections 
between police and local residents that may be helpful to homeland security 
strategies. In particular, a community-led approach could provide a clear alternative 
to a top-down, federal strategy that has created disturbing tensions between policing, 
preparedness, and civil liberties. Community-policing officers could serve as trusted 
intermediaries to encourage the necessary dialogue between security authorities and 
local residents on the nature of the risks that a community faces. 
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• Preventing homegrown radicalization. Radicalization is a social process that 
over time transforms otherwise well-established residents into disenfranchised 
militants willing to lash out with violence against people and property. The New York 
City Police Department, for instance, describes radicalized youths as otherwise 
“unremarkable” local residents who conceptualize and plan attacks against their 
country of residence inspired or ideologically driven by al Qaeda teachings.27  
Preventing this transformation from unremarkable to threat-laden requires a level of 
community engagement that is simply impossible to achieve through federal 
initiatives. Most importantly, it requires awareness and willingness on the part of 
local residents to cooperate with local police authorities. That awareness and 
willingness comes from experience working with or at least knowing about successful 
– and publicly accepted – police activities. The local officer who works in the same 
geographical area for several years and has helped with traffic, school, and family 
problems, or worked with community groups to shut down drug houses and other 
safety risks, is far more likely to observe radicalizing behaviors before they reach the 
point of violent action than any federal network of information-sharing agencies. He 
or she is also a much better user of federally-produced intelligence information and 
more likely to observe the initial, nuanced acts of a terrorist plot that are typically 
obscured by links to other criminal threats such as a gangs, gun-running, drug 
trafficking, and recently-released prisoners who may have been radicalized while 
incarcerated. 
• Reducing Americans’ fear of uncertainty and risk. If the goal of terrorism is 
to create fear far beyond the immediate harm, community policing offers a model for 
directly combating that objective through engagement and cooperation. Local law 
enforcement agencies have a strong self-interest in understanding fear in their 
communities if they hope to be effective. As recent debates over issues related to 
racial profiling and hate crimes have shown, local police agencies’ abilities to prevent 
terrorism may turn on how well they are able to understand their communities and 
work to solve everyday crime in those same communities.28 
Applying the lessons from a community-policing approach to community-oriented 
terrorism prevention could open a new line of thinking about the role of DHS regional 
offices and officers. As noted previously, FEMA regionalization offers an opportunity to 
begin to change the relationship between federal, state, tribal, and local agencies. 
Beyond becoming a catalyst for inter-sector coordination, however, a community 
oriented philosophy will require FEMA and its sister DHS components and agencies to 
reorient some of their operating approaches. Community-policing agencies are more 
“flat” than most organizations – that is, they are decentralized, network-oriented 
organizations in which officers working with neighborhood groups have more authority 
than usual to make decisions. This structure allows and even encourages officers to work 
as partners in joint decision-making, not having to always withhold judgment while they 
check with geographically distant and organizationally remote authorities.  
Community-oriented agencies are also more focused on smaller geographical areas 
that have organic rather than jurisdictional connections. This focus and flexibility allows 
more effective alignment of problem solving with the diverse partners needed to make 
necessary changes in programs and funding. A major challenge for DHS and FEMA 
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regional efforts will be to create and maintain a cross-jurisdictional focus that is not so 
broad that the relationships become merely consultative rather than oriented toward 
joint problem-solving and decision-making.  
A Call to Service 
“Through service, I found a community that embraced me, citizenship 
that was meaningful.” 
   —Barak Obama 
Throughout the most recent presidential campaign, nearly all candidates embraced a 
call to service, urging the American public to do more in their communities to improve 
the quality of life. The new administration’s plan calls for a significant investment in 
expanding the volunteer corps, including AmeriCorps, Peace Corps, Energy Corps, and 
Environmental Corps. Joining others, the plan calls for tax breaks, summer jobs, 
internships and college tuition in exchange for some form of public service. 
Obviously, homeland security and emergency management should take their place in 
this roll call of valued public services. The problem is that, under current strategies, 
there is little room for this type of public service in homeland security. The current 
citizen corps programs offer only limited opportunities for engagement. Community 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) training, which has been useful, is limited to 
specific training activities and, by itself, does not generate continuous activities in a 
community;29 and Citizen Corps Councils have generated far less activity than expected 
or needed.30 
At a local and regional level, the mobilization of residents to become educated, 
trained and involved in homeland security needs to take on a more sustainable effort. 
For this to happen, it needs to be integrated into the community’s routine activities, its 
local governance, work life, recreation, and shopping. The rich diversity of the nation’s 
communities means that no one type of program or set of initiatives will work 
everywhere. Yet every community could become involved. A national campaign is 
needed that focuses on community preparedness, starting perhaps with public health.     
Numerous creative ways to stimulate this community engagement exist. We need to 
find and expand the moments in which Americans routinely defy the allegations of 
complacency and denial and where they value the connectivity to their community 
which homeland security and emergency management strategies have ignored. A block 
grant challenge – a Community Preparedness Block Grant (CPBG), modeled perhaps 
after the success of infrastructure repair and historical preservation funds – could be a 
useful example. A preparedness corps of diverse local residents could organize 
neighborhood campaigns to, among other activities, canvas and teach the elderly how to 
turn off their natural gas in an emergency and link them to neighbors to whom they can 
turn if an incident occurs. These and many other ideas already exist in local 
communities across the country. They can be heard anecdotally at conferences, or read 
in local newspapers and researchers’ stories, but they await more widespread 
mobilization, support, and leadership.   
The challenge is not simply to acknowledge the need for such community activities, 
but to find a proper place for such activities within our homeland security strategy and 
execute their role effectively.31 Currently, efforts to engage local communities are 
primarily considered ways to get the government’s message across and perhaps add 
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helpers to the professional response cadre during an incident. A community-oriented 
homeland security strategy, in contrast, would value the ideas and the people engaged in 
the community because they are the fulcrum of effectiveness. In the same way that the 
nation relies on the professional expertise of its intelligence officers, border screeners, 
and critical infrastructure protectors, it must rely on the ability of local residents to be 
effective public citizens.   
TOWARD A SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
From a shared vision of a way of life to everyday interactions with neighbors, an 
effective homeland security strategy requires the full participation of the American 
public. The full array of these social activities, programs, and relationships constitutes 
an essential foundation, what can easily be called a “social infrastructure for homeland 
security.” Like other infrastructures, it needs priority attention and support. And like 
other infrastructures, it has fallen into disrepair.  
During the Cold War, the American public had a social compact with the federal 
government to lend its political and financial support for distant, not-well-understood 
actions overseas against a communist threat. The public came to expect protection from 
these overseas risks and, in exchange, wanted to go about its business of working hard, 
raising families, and enjoying the prosperity that lasted nearly half a century. 
Today’s asymmetric threats have changed the way we think about the world and the 
compact between the federal government and the public. The initial round of homeland 
security strategies has not yet caught up with this global and internal transformation.  
While the nation fights overseas, a new social compact at home is needed that redefines 
opportunities and responsibilities just as much as world events are changing the risks 
and challenges to the American way of life.32 
Ask any homeland security or emergency management professional what makes them 
most successful in their activities and most will say that it is the trust that they 
developed in their coworkers and colleagues well before an incident or operation. Trust 
is also the glue that makes communities work. At a time when trust in government, trust 
in public health institutions, and trust in the financial system are weakening, it is 
unlikely that efforts to mobilize the public to be prepared for emergencies will work. The 
first step in the long transition to a new social compact, then, may be the most direct – 
to repair and build the trust that makes our most critical activities succeed. Social trust 
may be the meaning we can all find in community service, and strengthening it may be 
the way to navigate through the deep currents of our future. 
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The Anthrax Vaccine: A Dilemma for Homeland Security 
Thomas L. Rempfer 
 
Past problems with the Department of Defense anthrax vaccine currently impact 
national emergency response plans approved by the Department of Homeland Security 
and Department of Health and Human Services. Following the 2001 anthrax letter 
attacks, those departments diverged from long established protocols advocating limited 
use of the old anthrax vaccine, also known as BioThrax®. The Executive departments 
procured mass quantities of the product for the Strategic National Stockpile as a 
prophylaxis for citizens under emergency contingencies. The departments share 
oversight responsibilities for the emergency stockpile’s composition of vaccines and 
drugs based on Presidential Directives.1 Yet a review of past oversight efforts reveals 
regulatory problems, ethical controversies and dubious threat assessments underlying 
use of the vaccine. Based on the historic controversy, and studies suggesting the 
majority of U.S. service members continue to object to the vaccine’s use,2 the 
government should resurvey the vaccine’s suitability for American citizens. A thorough 
review may find that widespread use of a known antiquated product of disputed safety 
and efficacy in treating a non-communicable threat provides an imprudent illusion of 
protection for our citizens. 
This article explores the Department of Defense’s experience with the anthrax 
vaccine, and the troubling possibility that the 2001 anthrax letter attacks were a 
deliberate and successful effort to sustain a program that federal investigators 
determined was on the verge of failing. Reflection on why the mandatory military 
program escaped review following the federal investigation warrants deliberation. 
Enumerating the safety, efficacy, regulatory and legal problems encountered by the 
military program provides a prism to analyze future hurdles in using the vaccine on 
civilians. Finally, comparing past problems with current threat assessments offers an 
opportunity to suggest potential alternative countermeasures which minimize the 
negative externalities resulting from the old anthrax vaccine. 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANTHRAX VACCINE EXPERIENCE 
Doctrinal debate over the current anthrax vaccine’s role in biodefense precipitated 
initiation of the Defense Department’s mandatory anthrax vaccine immunization 
program.3 A Washington Post article captured the controversy, stating that “Military 
leaders were initially doubtful about the need for the anthrax vaccine.” The exposé 
revealed an inverted policy process – “starting at the top instead of trying to staff an 
issue from the bottom up” – adding to the program’s problematic origins.4 
The only previous mass use of the 1950s-era vaccine occurred in the 1990s, when over 
150,000 soldiers received inoculations during the first Gulf War, with many later 
reporting illnesses of unknown origins.5 A decade later, the George W. Bush 
administration recognized the problems associated with the anthrax vaccine and Gulf 
War Syndrome. Officials directed a review of the program early in 2001. A memo from 
Presidential Advisor Karl Rove to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz6 resulted 
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in recommendations from Defense Undersecretaries Dr. David Chu and Edward 
Aldridge to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.7 The defense officials advocated 
halting the mass mandatory program and continuing use of the vaccine only at a 
“minimum level.” They recommended purchasing biological detection devices and 
antibiotics to protect the soldiers “in the absence of an anthrax vaccine.”  
The undersecretaries suggested a comprehensive review of doctrinal positions and 
development of a “coherent institutional process” for future prioritization of threats and 
assessments of countermeasures. The leaders also echoed a longstanding call for 
development of a “national long-range vaccine.” The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff subsequently challenged these recommendations, insisting the vaccine was “the 
centerpiece of our defense against the most likely biological threat agent.”8 Newspaper 
articles captured the debate over use of the vaccine,9 and recent Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and Department of Justice revelations reignited the controversy. The 
Justice Department alleged the anthrax vaccine program’s “failing” status served as the 
stated motive in the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. By sending anthrax through the U.S. 
mail system, the perpetrator was attempting to create a situation where the government 
might recognize a renewed need for the vaccine.10 
The government’s subsequent decision to continue to procure the vaccine after the 
letter attacks appears to discount the prior problems encountered by the U.S. military. 
The Department of Defense acknowledged those problems as early as 1985 in a proposal 
request to solicit a new vaccine.11 The proposal emphasized the “requirement to develop 
a safe and effective product which will protect U.S. troops” from anthrax spores. 
Pentagon officials confirmed the military lacked a vaccine that safely and effectively 
protected military personnel against exposure to anthrax. U.S. Army scientists also 
acknowledged the product as an “experimental limited-use vaccine.”12 Two 
congressional reports corroborated these findings. One report established that prior to 
the first Gulf War the anthrax vaccine “was rarely used,” considered “investigational,” 
and deemed it as “a potential cause for undiagnosed illnesses in Persian Gulf military 
personnel.”13 The other report determined the current anthrax vaccine was 
“experimental.”14 
Safety and Efficacy Issues 
Additional oversight reports cited Pentagon studies acknowledging that up to 35 percent 
of soldiers had adverse reactions to the anthrax vaccine, and that 6 percent of recipients 
reported serious complications after vaccination.15 The military studies caused 
authorities to alter previously low adverse reaction rates, changing warnings listed on 
the approved labeling.16 Despite the changes, the military continued to insist on the 
safety of the vaccine, while the Government Accountability Office disclosed that “a 
significantly large number of vaccine recipients reported experiencing adverse events.”17 
Government oversight reports confirmed the long-term safety of the vaccine had not 
been assessed, while raising questions about ingredient alterations and problems with 
human efficacy testing of the vaccine.18  
Recent Department of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War 
Veterans’ Illnesses Scientific Findings and Recommendations validated concerns that 
REMPFER, ANTHRAX VACCINE 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 2 (MAY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
3 
“studies have indicated that the current anthrax vaccine is associated with high rates of 
acute adverse reactions.”19 Though the report ostensibly dismissed the anthrax vaccine 
as a possible cause of veteran illnesses, the study acknowledged the need for further 
research to “analyze associations between Gulf War illness and individual vaccines, 
combinations of vaccines” and to evaluate “diagnosed diseases in personnel known to 
have received the anthrax vaccine.”20 An earlier Institute of Medicine report 
corroborated the need for more data stating, “There is a paucity of published peer-
reviewed literature on the safety of the anthrax vaccine.”21 A later report included 
additional findings that the “current anthrax vaccine is difficult to standardize, is 
incompletely characterized, and is relatively reactogenic [reactive].” The institute 
acknowledged the “long and challenging” dose regimen and determined a “new vaccine, 
developed according to more modern principles of vaccinology, is urgently needed.”22 
Accordingly, the government recently moved to reduce the vaccine’s cumbersome 
eighteen-month, six-dose regimen to five shots, and altered the route of administration 
in order to decrease “adverse events.” While the continued lengthy protocol seems 
incompatible with emergency response, the efficacy of the reduced dosage remains 
unproven due to pending submissions of immunogenicity response data. As a result, 
health officials continue to confirm “routine immunization is not recommended.”23 The 
conclusions comport with pre-2001 cautions from a former commander of the U.S. 
Army Medical Research and Development Command at Fort Detrick concerning 
multiple doses and purification issues, which “argue strongly against procuring large 
amounts for civilian use.”24 
Regulatory issues 
Regulatory lapses also marked troubles with past use of the vaccine, leading to a Food 
and Drug Administration notice of intent to revoke the anthrax vaccine manufacturer’s 
license based on quality control deviations.25 The Government Accountability Office, in 
a report titled “Anthrax Vaccine Changes to the Manufacturing Process,” also revealed 
pre-2001 unreported production alterations that violated Food and Drug 
Administration rules.26 The report revealed that the vaccine maker failed to notify the 
government about alterations to the manufacturing process in the early 1990s, and 
reported the manufacturer did not perform the requisite studies to confirm vaccine 
quality remained unaffected. The Government Accountability Office also discovered 
potential potency problems resulting from the unreported alterations, and documented 
violations of regulations in their inspection report. The analysts noted government rules 
where “any changes to the manufacturing that have the potential to affect the safety, 
purity, or potency of a biologic must be submitted and approved … prior to 
implementation.” Despite this requirement, requests for approval of the alterations did 
not occur for up to ten years after implementation.27 The problematic potency issues, 
and a myriad of quality control problems, ultimately resulted in government regulators 
deeming that the “manufacturing process for Anthrax Vaccine is not validated” as early 
as 1998.28 Notwithstanding past problems, the government expedited manufacturing 
process validation for the vaccine immediately following the anthrax letter attacks in 
October 2001.29 
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The problems with vaccine potency testing appeared to weigh heavily on the mind of 
the U.S Army scientist suspected of mailing the 2001 anthrax letters that killed five 
Americans. Emails released by federal investigators revealed the scientist’s contention 
that the vaccine “isn’t passing the potency test,” as well as the implications of these 
failures. The scientist’s email stated, “If it doesn’t pass … the program will come to a 
halt.” The government’s analysis of the anthrax letter attack crimes documented that the 
implicated U.S. Army scientist held direct responsibility for the problematic potency 
testing as a member of the army’s anthrax potency testing team.  
Additional emails quoted the scientist’s concerns that “apparently Gore (and maybe 
even Bush) is considering making the anthrax vaccine for the military voluntary, or even 
stopping the program.” In addition to alleging the vaccine’s problems served as the 2001 
anthrax letter-attack motive, the Federal Bureau of Investigation documented the 
coincidence of anthrax vaccine program resumption following the crimes, and the army 
scientist’s award of the highest military honors for “getting the anthrax vaccine back into 
production.”30 The U.S. Army’s Medical Research and Material Command also 
acknowledged the army scientist helped to get the “the anthrax vaccine back into 
production…working directly with the manufacturer…to determine where the problems 
were and resolve them so the vaccine would pass the potency test.”31 The scientist 
himself acknowledged, “Awards are nice. But the real satisfaction is knowing the vaccine 
is back on-line.”32  
Despite the known and potentially unresolved pre-2001 problems, the letter attacks 
succeeded in reversing the suspected cancellation of the Defense Department’s 
mandatory program and directly resulted in significantly expanded procurement of the 
old anthrax vaccine for America’s emergency stockpile in the years that followed. 
Legal Issues 
The anthrax vaccine also suffers from a troubled legal history. Federal courts affirmed 
the vaccine “was an investigational drug being used for an unapproved purpose.”33 
Other federal courts reaffirmed this ruling, declaring the Pentagon’s program as a 
“violation of federal law” prior to a belated, court ordered licensure of the vaccine.34 The 
vaccine received a final Food and Drug Administration license twenty years after a 1985 
proposed rule, fifty years after the vaccine’s advent.35 The licensing occurred after the 
courts ruled the mandatory military program illegal and “investigational” absent the 
requisite finalized license in accordance with governmental rule-making procedures.36  
Despite the critical judicial reviews, the government allocated over $1.2 billion for 
the anthrax vaccine, adding to a long history of earlier extraordinary financial relief for 
the embattled manufacturer.37 The latest appropriations occurred immediately after the 
2008 Federal Bureau of Investigation findings, adding to more than $50 billion 
allocated to bolster biological defenses in reaction to the letter attacks.38 Complicating 
the controversy, the Food and Drug Administration acknowledged the Department of 
Defense served as de facto manufacturer of the vaccine due to its “continuous 
involvement with, and intimate knowledge of, the formulation and manufacturing 
processes of all of these versions of the anthrax vaccine.”39 Military involvement in 
manufacturing and altering of a vaccine, long sold to the troops and the American 
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people as fully approved despite the lack of required prior approvals for alterations, 
presents distinct legal liabilities worthy of additional examination. 
THREAT ASSESSMENTS  
Official threat assessments also raise questions about the need for the old anthrax 
vaccine in national stockpiles. The Government Accountability Office reported that the 
Defense Department determined “the nature and magnitude of the anthrax threat has 
been stable since 1990.”40 A United Nations report substantiated past conventional 
wisdom about the potential threat of weaponized anthrax prior to the first Gulf War, but 
confirmed that the Iraqi program suffered technological hurdles in fielding dry 
weaponized anthrax.41 Government Accountability Office reports also noted that 
terrorists would find it difficult to overcome the technological and operational 
challenges on the road to employing a biological warfare agent.42 Nevertheless, in 
congressional testimony Pentagon leaders previously insisted that they possessed 
“absolutely unequivocal evidence” that Iraq had weaponized anthrax prior to the first 
Gulf War. Though subsequent threat assessments turned out to be “dead wrong,”43 the 
leaders added to the vaccine imperative by insisting, “An anthrax attack is fatal if you 
are not inoculated.”44  
Even after the 2001 letter attacks by the Army scientist demonstrated that antibiotics 
successfully countered lethal exposures to highly virulent spores, military leaders 
continued to maintain the anthrax attacks in October 2001 justified use of the vaccine.45 
These assertions defy medical evidence and expert recommendations. According to the 
Monterey WMD Terrorism Database, twelve anthrax “incidents” and 472 “hoaxes” 
occurred in the United States since 1992.46 For all actual infections diagnosed promptly, 
antibiotics successfully mitigated the resulting illnesses. As a result, government experts 
recommend antibiotics to combat the most lethal inhalation form of the disease. 
Ultimately, both the hyperbole of the threat and pronouncements of certain death 
absent anthrax inoculation proved to be categorically false. Regardless, the vaccine 
remains unapproved in “a post-exposure setting” and “not recommended for routine 
pre-event anthrax vaccination.”47 As well, the Centers for Disease Control Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices recommendations maintain that “Occupational 
groups engaged in response activities are not routinely recommended to receive anthrax 
vaccine due to lack of a calculable risk assessment.”48 
Threat assessments beyond the military require review as well. Shortly after the 
anthrax letter attacks the Department of Homeland Security National Strategy for 
Homeland Security emphasized the threat,49 as did the president’s State of the Union 
Address.50 Later, references to anthrax vaccine waned entirely from the most recent 
Homeland Security Strategy.51 As well, the homeland security secretary conceded “there 
is not currently a domestic emergency involving anthrax.” The secretary confirmed 
“There is not currently a heightened risk of an anthrax attack” and no credible 
information was present to indicate an imminent threat of an attack involving bacillus 
anthracis.52 Despite this statement, the Department of Health and Human Services 
declared an “anthrax emergency” through 2015 based on the “significant potential for a 
domestic emergency.”53 The emergency declaration purpose was intended to provide 
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product liability protection to manufacturers of stockpile countermeasures, including 
anthrax vaccine.  
Further academic and independent analysis also refutes the severity of the anthrax 
threat. One example points to the Aum Shinrikyo group’s unsuccessful attempts to 
produce and disperse anthrax. They also cited al Qaeda’s unsuccessful effort to obtain 
anthrax and to create a microbiological research facility. They noted that the 2001 
anthrax letter attacks remained the only successful “distribution of a high-quality dry-
powder preparation,”54 while the Federal Bureau of Investigation later determined that 
this attack originated from inside the U.S. biodefense community. A more measured, 
non-reactive approach also emerged from the National Academy of Sciences. Their 
report cautioned that society is too complex and interconnected to defend against every 
threat. The academy addressed the letter-attack threat as well stating “Reactions to 
anthrax episodes were strongly conditioned – and exaggerated.”55 Additional evidence 
of a growing scientific movement away from the old anthrax vaccine includes a recent 
report by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation and Terrorism. That report recommended use of “oral antibiotics” for the 
anthrax threat in lieu of vaccine. The congressionally sponsored report also advocated 
development of new classes of antibiotics against genetically modified anthrax. The 
commission called upon the next president to “enhance the nation’s capabilities for 
rapid response to prevent biological attacks,” but omitted any reference or 
recommendations to use the old anthrax vaccine.56  
CONCLUSION 
This less-than-reassuring review of the military experience with the old anthrax vaccine 
represents an opportunity for a thorough review by the new leadership of the 
Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services. Questions about 
the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine have been a constant theme since its 
inception, while manufacturing irregularities and legal problems nearly ended the 
program. The fact that the 2001 anthrax letter attacks were undertaken by the scientist 
in charge of vaccine potency testing for a program on the verge of failure, and that the 
attacks served to reinvigorate a troubled program in response to a “manufactured” 
crisis, creates fundamental doubts about expanding use of the vaccine. 
In light of uncertain threat assessments, relying on the letter attacks as 
rationalization for continued use of a product with well-known problems fails the litmus 
test of good government and sound public health policy. Those attacks, and Defense 
Department “continuous involvement” with the anthrax vaccine, effectively adulterated 
normal procurement processes involving the old anthrax vaccine, perpetuating the 
troubled program beyond a normal shelf life. Documented violations of the law indelibly 
stain the program from a historic perspective; while safety, efficacy, and necessity 
questions provide pragmatic justification for pursuing alternative protections. Sound 
alternatives include procurement of proven antibiotics and the development of next-
generation technologies to address legitimate threats. 
Fortunately, current top health officials recognize the salient need for “new vaccines, 
especially against anthrax,” and the “need to ensure that research institutions and 
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individual researchers keep track of the whereabouts of dangerous pathogens, handle 
them safely, and store them securely.”57 Since federal investigators report “no other 
anthrax attacks” have occurred since the 2001 crimes, the time is right to realign current 
and future appropriations in the direction of modern, proven, and recommended 
countermeasures versus the old anthrax vaccine. At a minimum, a thorough review of 
the government’s use of the anthrax vaccine is in order to protect taxpayer resources in a 
fiscally constrained environment. 
Accordingly, President Barack Obama’s appointees in the Departments of Homeland 
Security and Health and Human Services should commence a comprehensive review of 
expanded use of the vaccine early in the new administration to protect the government 
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 Global Metropolitan Policing: An Emerging 
Trend in Intelligence Sharing 
John P. Sullivan and James J. Wirtz 
The emergence of transnational criminal actors challenges national law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies. Global criminals are involved in traditional organized crime 
activities, e.g., theft, smuggling, and dealing in all types of contraband. These criminal 
networks, however, also engage in activities that can fuel domestic and international 
conflicts, potentially creating threats that can undermine state actors and existing 
security regimes. The tensions created by what amounts to the “darker side” of 
globalization challenge existing mechanisms of cooperation among various national 
police organizations.   
The purpose of this article is to explore how transnational criminal networks are 
creating incentives to change traditional police operations and to describe how law 
enforcement officers can better coordinate their activities as they adapt to contain and 
eliminate global criminal threats. To accomplish this objective, the article first describes 
the global, networked dimension of this threat. It then describes the differences between 
current practice of “international policing” and an emerging approach to countering the 
criminal threat, best described as “global metropolitan policing.” The article concludes 
by offering several suggestions on how law enforcement agencies can acquire the skill 
sets and practices needed to address the global criminal enterprise. 
GLOBAL THREATS AND THE POLICE 
Police, like the rest of society, face a changing political, technical, and economic setting.  
Traditionally, urban police forces confined their activities to their immediate local area 
for the simple reason that criminal activity was primarily a local phenomenon – 
jurisdictions generally matched patterns of criminal activity. As globalization and 
technology stimulated greater linkages among cities, widespread connections between 
criminal and terrorist activity began to surface, culminating in a new range of threats 
that local police had to address. 
One component of this threat stream is the global Islamist jihad. Islamist movements 
form a loose confederation of independent groups with varying roles and reach. They 
often work in a cooperative manner among “theaters of operation.” Local groups gather 
intelligence and targeting data and share it across the global jihadi network. David 
Kilcullen believes that this movement is best viewed as a global insurgency. Countering 
it, according to Kilcullen, “demands extremely close coordination and integration 
between and within police, intelligence, military, development, aid, information, and 
administrative agencies” – a difficult task when undertaken at the global level.1  
Other observers believe that Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda is a malignant and mutated 
version of the market-state – an emerging state form. Al Qaeda and its kin are more 
than state-less gangs.2 These networked adversaries possess standing armies, treasury 
and revenue sources derived from criminal enterprises, a bureaucracy or “civil” service, 
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intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, welfare systems, and the ability to make 
alliances with state and other non-state actors. They also promulgate law and policy for 
their adherents and declare war. From this perspective, the al Qaeda network 
constitutes a sort of virtual state that can control territory. Through insurgency and 
terrorism it seeks to influence events and policies across the globe. 
Criminal and terrorist networks thus constitute a departure from traditional criminal 
activity because they are not concentrated in any one local jurisdiction. They create a 
problem for everyone, but they belong to no one. Actions taken by a few local 
jurisdictions or even states can deliver a setback to the criminal network, but they 
cannot destroy the network because it exists outside of their jurisdictions. To contain 
and eventually destroy these international criminal and terrorist enterprises, local and 
national jurisdictions have to work together in real time. The traditional distinction 
between domestic and foreign threats that is common in both the law enforcement and 
security studies literature seems especially inappropriate because the external threat 
posed by terrorists to one state actually represents an ongoing domestic threat to 
another government. In effect, the nature of this threat creates a good deal of pressure 
to increase the pace, scope, and intensity of global law enforcement activity. Without 
global engagement, terrorists can always retreat to safe havens provided by 
unchallenged portions of their networks.  
FROM INTERNATIONAL TO GLOBAL METROPOLITAN POLICING  
In the past, local police worked within their own geographically limited jurisdictions.  
When international cooperation was needed in an ongoing investigation, “international 
policing” provided the model for interstate relationships. In international policing, 
national police organizations served as the conduit for sharing information among 
foreign law enforcement agencies. To facilitate this exchange between states, bilateral 
relationships – limited to specific investigations or cases – were developed. Over time, 
international institutions, such as the 181-member International Criminal Police 
Organization (ICPO-Interpol), founded in 1923, and the European Police Office 
(Europol), founded in 1992, were created to help facilitate this “case-by-case” 
collaboration. As Mathieu Deflem observes, “law enforcement institutions engage in a 
variety of international activities and have forged international cooperative structures 
and organizations that aim to foster collaboration in the fight against crimes that are of 
an international nature.”3 International policing relies on international institutions, not 
ad hoc collaboration among local agencies, to exchange information about individuals 
and events of mutual interest. 
In federal states, international relations are largely left to federal agencies. In the 
United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) carries out most international 
liaison activity and the federally sponsored National Central Bureau largely deals with 
Interpol. International police activities undertaken by the United States are primarily 
planned and executed by a limited number of U.S. federal law enforcement agencies and 
departments. The FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) are the most active 
U.S. law enforcement agencies operating overseas. The FBI’s system of legats (legal 
attachés) places representatives in fifty-two countries, while the DEA’s foreign liaison 
system maintains seventy-eight offices in fifty-six countries.4 International policing can 
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thus be quite extensive, playing an important role in traditional international law 
enforcement and diplomatic activity. 
GLOBAL METROPOLITAN POLICING 
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, police forces across the globe 
have developed new domestic and international counter-terrorism strategies, while 
international police agencies have likewise stepped up their efforts to combat terrorism. 
Because of the nature of the threat, many of these activities require greater international 
cooperation, leading police organizations to act more independently in relation to the 
dictates of the national governments of their respective states.5 As a result of this 
bureaucratic autonomy, local police forces are developing and sharing expert “systems 
of knowledge” with fellow professionals across national boundaries.6  Deflem notes that 
this activity is undertaken in response to the full range of international crime, is 
oriented toward local and national enforcement  tasks, and primarily involves bi-lateral 
liaison activities focused on specific, short-term collaborative investigations.7 These 
developments have not led to the formation of a supranational police force, but they 
have led to the emergence of a global metropolitan network and global metropolitan 
policing.8  
Global metropolitan policing includes both national and metropolitan law 
enforcement agencies as well as linkages with intelligence organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and private and corporate security entities. This 
collaboration involves efforts to construct security-intelligence networks. The 
globalization of this police activity involves the dispersal of security governance along 
nodal (network-based) lines involving state, corporate, non-governmental, and informal 
nodes rather than a network that is solely based on state-sponsored entities. These 
networks involve informal relationships between social agents and agencies that treat 
each other as equals. These informal links contribute to the evolution of formal 
networks among security agencies that are often codified by treaties or other types of 
legal agreements. 9 
In Peter Gill’s formulation, the territory where police and security networks emerge is 
both symbolic and physical. These networks provide information and intelligence to 
support traditional policing of people and spaces. Global metropolitan policing thus 
involves a “deepening” of the levels of government involved – local, regional, national, 
and transnational. It also involves “broadening” of the sectors of society involved in 
sharing information – state, corporate, and community. Gill also notes that it involves a 
“stretching” of spatiality based on the idea that “developments in one part of the globe 
can have immediate and world-wide impact.”10 These networks routinely cross agency 
boundaries, mediating between, if not transcending, different local, state, and national 
sovereignties.11 According to D. Bigo, the impact of this activity already is profound, 
producing “networks of control agents who see as their primary task the maintenance of 
public order, broadly conceived, and who distance themselves from all political 
reasoning.” 12  Global metropolitan policing has created a network of thousands of 
agents working together every day; in so doing, they are breaking down national 
sovereignty and other kinds of jurisdictional boundaries. 
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NEW NETWORKS 
New law enforcement networks are the foundation of global policing. Some networks 
are created by linking national and local police forces. In response to transnational 
gangs, for instance, a partnership was formed between U.S. and Salvadoran law 
enforcement officials. The Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) initiative (Centro 
Antipandillas Transnacional) was intended to target the violent Mara Salvatrucha 
(MS-13). This network emerged when two agents from the FBI were stationed in San 
Salvador to work directly alongside investigators and analysts from El Salvador’s Policia 
Nacional Civil. The collaboration was undertaken by the FBI to conduct joint 
investigations, share information and intelligence, and provide technical assistance.13  
Other initiatives link major municipalities directly with other jurisdictions. For 
instance, the New York Police Department (NYPD) has developed its own global liaison 
network. NYPD’s liaison program is based on the premise that the NYPD has to operate 
globally because the war on terrorism has no national boundaries. New York’s Police 
Foundation, which partially funds the program, refers to the initiative as “Global 
Policing in the 21st Century.” NYPD has deployed detectives to Toronto, Montreal, 
Santo Domingo, London, Paris, Lyon, Madrid, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Singapore.14 These 
NYPD detectives are unarmed and are not directly involved in investigations and 
enforcement actions. Instead, their primary responsibility is to foster the exchange of 
information, warnings, and best practices among law enforcement professionals who 
can put this information to immediate use. 
Although detectives are engaged solely in liaison and information exchange, the 
NYPD initiative is not without it critics. According to Judith Miller “[the presence of 
NYPD detectives] overseas has strained the department’s often tense relations with the 
F.B.I. In Israel, for instance, the bureau [FBI] opposed creating the post for the 
department’s detective, according to American and Israeli officials.”15 The fact that 
NYPD encounters bureaucratic resistance to its efforts to “go global” suggests that its 
liaison initiatives have clearly encroached on the “domain” of other agencies. 
Nevertheless, such initiatives are just the beginning of a new type of urban law 
enforcement, a logical response to new threats and to new technological opportunities 
that empower domestic organizations to take a more direct interest in international 
events that impact local security.   
NETWORKS AND POLICING 
Although John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt note that “it takes networks to fight 
networks,” the good news is that terrorists and criminals are not alone in their ability to 
organize themselves as a network.16 Corporations, nongovernmental organizations, 
government agencies and officials can work as decentralized, informal, and flexible 
entities that rely on exchanges of data and ideas to achieve their objectives. National and 
municipal governments can address networked threats by establishing their own global 
or regional networks of financial regulators, prosecutors, criminal investigators, 
immigration officials, transportation officials, and customs agents. 17 
According to Ann-Marie Slaughter, changes in state forms are already occurring. 
States are likely to become increasingly disaggregated as government networks populate 
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a new global landscape. In her view, horizontal and vertical government networks are 
emerging. Horizontal networks, characterized by peer-to-peer links with professional 
counterparts across borders, will be the most common form of cooperation. Vertical, 
government networks, between national government officials and their supranational 
counterparts (e.g., the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court and the 
Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights), will become lesser players. In 
Slaughter’s typology, there are information, enforcement, and harmonization networks 
that can be arranged as horizontal, vertical, or disaggregated international 
organizations. Information networks are cooperative and frequently informal.  
Enforcement networks result from the inability of individual agencies to enforce the law.  
Harmonization networks are typically authorized by treaty or by executive agreement.  
These networks can be codified in formal agreements, emerge as informal 
arrangements, or emerge as a spontaneous response to an emerging threat or 
opportunity.18  
Law enforcement is already adopting many of these different types of organizing 
principles. The Financial Action Task Force on money laundering (FATF), which seeks 
to detect and prevent misuse of world financial systems by terrorists, is a noteworthy 
example of a networked police organization.19 The FATF brings together state and sub-
state actors from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, the 
European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, the Gulf Co-Operation 
Council, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Holland, New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Traditional organizations also have taken on attributes of networks. For instance, 
Europol created a crisis center for coordination and information sharing and a task force 
for broad analysis and threat assessments. In terms of fostering contacts among 
individual professionals, Eurojust (the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit) 
seeks to increase judicial cooperation and information exchange through direct contact 
among judges, an implicit recognition of the need for cross-border judicial relations to 
address transnational threats.20 
CONCLUSION 
The law enforcement response to terrorists and transnational threats posed by 
organized crime and third-generation gangs must build on best practices related to 
community interaction, investigation, intelligence and enforcement. At the local level, 
police must work with the community to protect against crime and victimization. Police 
must be visible. They must engage community partners to build trust within their 
immediate jurisdictions. They must not be seen as serving as instruments of repression 
and corruption. Law enforcement is first and foremost responsible for maintaining 
situational awareness across local jurisdictions. This is the basis of global metropolitan 
policing. 
Linking professional, accountable, and democratic police and law enforcement 
agencies in a distributed-network fashion can help stop the transnational criminal 
enterprise. Because overseas criminal and terrorist networks are beyond the reach of 
any one territorial jurisdiction or any one domestic law enforcement authority, they can 
evade standard countermeasures pursued in any one country. Law enforcement is 
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constrained by a world with borders, while international criminals and terrorists move 
in a borderless world and are free to seek the path of least resistance when it comes to 
carrying out their schemes.21  
Global metropolitan policing is beginning to compete with international policing as a 
model of police co-operation. NYPD’s International Liaison Program is an example of 
this trend. Personnel exchanges among police agencies for liaison and the deployment of 
police officers to participate in task forces abroad are likely to increase as police battle 
terrorism, transnational gangs, and global crime. 
This trend challenges traditional police relationships. Intelligence and law 
enforcement operations now intersect, eroding the distinction between domestic and 
foreign police and intelligence activities. Metropolitan police join national police as 
liaisons occur among and across all levels of governance. These new types of liaison will 
require police to acquire new skills. Individual police officers as well as their home 
organizations will need to understand the nature of diplomacy and international 
relations, master multiple languages, understand multiple culture and legal systems, 
and bridge police and intelligence operations. Police continue to conduct the majority of 
their activities locally, but they have to think globally and bring that global knowledge 
back home. International meetings, professional exchanges across disciplines, and 
public diplomacy now join local crime fighting as essential police skills.   
Police and law enforcement need to co-operate across national boundaries to better 
preserve the rule of law in all nations and to foster global security. Building capabilities 
that expand upon formal structures, such as Interpol and Europol, while stimulating 
new multilateral connectivity and co-operation is essential to combating these global 
criminal threats. These capabilities must serve as a bridge from local to global activities.  
They must embrace civil societies across territorial divides and different cultural 
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Exploring the Relationship between Homeland Security 
Information Sharing & Local Emergency Preparedness 
Hamilton Bean 
INTRODUCTION 
Information sharing between federal, state, and local agencies is a key element of the 
U.S. government’s homeland security strategy. For federal officials, the post-9/11 threat 
environment requires a “trusted partnership” among federal, state, and local agencies to 
“make information sharing integrated, interconnected, effective and as automatic as 
possible in order to ensure our national security.”1 To support this vision, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) administer 
more than a dozen homeland security-related information-sharing systems.2 
Additionally, numerous governmental, commercial, and non-governmental 
organizations provide officials with homeland security alerts, updates, and databases to 
support preparedness efforts.3 State-level “fusion centers” also integrate, analyze, and 
disseminate “all-source” homeland security information. 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks focused public attention on the need for better information 
sharing among intelligence, law enforcement, and emergency management agencies. 
For example, the report of the Joint Inquiry of the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees, which investigated the circumstances surrounding 9/11, noted that “one of 
the most significant problems examined during the open hearings was the lack of 
information sharing between agencies.”4 Similarly, the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report 
concluded: “The biggest impediment to all-source analysis – to a greater likelihood of 
connecting the dots – is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information.”5 As a 
result, the 9/11 Commission stated that agencies “should provide incentives for sharing, 
to restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge.”6 Many of the 
findings of the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission were codified into law as part of 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Additionally, former 
President Bush issued several executive orders requiring federal agencies to develop and 
implement policies and systems designed to enhance information sharing. These efforts 
culminated in the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing.7 
More than two decades of research has correlated information technology use with 
organizational effectiveness.8 As a result, there has been little reason for officials to 
doubt the premise that improving the country’s information-sharing systems will 
enhance homeland security preparedness.9 Enormous financial, human, and 
technological resources have thus been dedicated to information-sharing initiatives 
across federal, state, and local levels.10 It is therefore striking that so few empirical 
studies have sought to confirm the basic premises underlying information-sharing 
discourse and organizational practice.11 One reason to reexamine these premises is that 
results have been marginal or counterintuitive in studies that have attempted to 
correlate information sharing with decision quality,12 emergency preparedness,13 
response planning,14 and law enforcement productivity and effectiveness.15 These 
studies generally affirm a 2005 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report which 
found that “although important, the benefits of sharing information are often difficult to 
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discern, while the risks and costs of sharing are direct and foreseeable.”16 Additionally, 
recent reports by both the Inspector General of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence and the Markel Foundation indicated that major challenges in 
implementing information-sharing initiatives endure.17     
Admittedly, the government’s information-sharing strategy will take many years to 
implement, and some might argue that evaluating the strategy’s efficacy is premature. 
The goal of this preliminary study is to explore how officials make sense of the 
connection between homeland security information sharing and preparedness at the 
local level. In the best case, information sharing evokes images of progress, 
technological sophistication, security, collaboration, and reform. This study suggests, 
however, that information sharing also evokes images of turf war, bureaucratic 
ineptitude, irrelevance, and technological obsolescence. The perspective on information 
sharing advanced herein is based on the principle that organizational discourse (e.g., the 
speech and writing of organizational members) and symbolism help to generate 
understandings of information sharing and preparedness in ways that influence 
practice.18 Exploring this discourse and symbolism can, ideally, help stakeholders better 
design, implement, conduct, and monitor information-sharing efforts that meet 
preparedness objectives.  
This study first reviews recent research concerning information sharing and 
preparedness to suggest why the assumed definitions of these concepts, and the 
relationship between them, requires a second look. The initial attempt to provide that 
second look involved using the government’s premises and relevant scholarly literature 
to generate hypotheses and a survey instrument. The survey results, however, mostly 
reinforced the ambiguous findings of earlier empirical studies. A communication 
perspective and respondent interviews attempted to account for this ambiguity. After 
describing the theoretical perspectives and methodologies used herein, this study 
provides an analysis of the survey and interview responses. It concludes with a 
discussion of implications for both research and policy. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION SHARING AND 
PREPAREDNESS  
William V. Pelfey explained how information sharing ideally leads to improved 
awareness and preparedness: “If … information sharing [is] effective, threats, risks, and 
vulnerabilities can be effectively identified, targets can be appropriately hardened, and 
suspects identified while an event is still in its inchoate stage.”19 Thus, officials who 
access homeland security information-sharing systems on a routine basis should 
generally be more aware of potential threats than those who seldom access such 
systems.20 Frequency of information system use has also been found to correlate with 
decision quality.21 Therefore, based on the posited relationships among frequency of 
system use, awareness, and decision quality: 
Hypothesis 1A: Frequency of homeland security information-sharing system use 
will influence awareness of homeland security threats.  
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Hypothesis 1B: Frequency of homeland security information-sharing system use 
will influence the perceived level of organizational preparedness.  
The ISE [Information Sharing Environment] Implementation Plan notes that 
information quality issues have hampered information-sharing efforts: “Most critical 
infrastructure sectors … are still concerned with the limited quantity and quality of 
information and the need for more specific, timely, and actionable information.”22 In 
their updated review of the information systems success literature, William H. Delone 
and Ephram R. McLean found a significant correlation between “information quality” 
and “individual impacts.”23 Accuracy, timeliness, completeness, relevance, and 
consistency defined information quality while decision-making performance, job 
effectiveness, and quality of work defined individual impacts. It is thus reasonable to 
assume that stakeholders who find the information available via information-sharing 
systems of high quality will tend to use those systems more frequently and report higher 
levels of job effectiveness than those who perceive the information quality to be low. 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2A: Level of perceived homeland security information quality will 
influence frequency of information-sharing system use.   
Hypothesis 2B: Level of perceived homeland security information quality will 
influence perceived level of job effectiveness.   
The concept of preparedness eludes agreed upon definitions and measures. Ronald D. 
Fricker, Jerry O. Jacobson, and Lois M. Davis state: 
Because of the lack of authoritative threat and outcome assessments, 
preparedness or lack thereof in any particular jurisdiction is largely a matter of 
subjective opinion. Without comprehensive threat assessments, it is exceptionally 
difficult to define how much preparation is enough and hence specify what 
‘appropriate’ preparedness is for any jurisdiction.24 
Pelfrey attempted to establish a more concrete definition of preparedness by explaining 
that preparedness can be seen as both a “cycle” and an “end-state.” As a cycle, the four 
phases of preparedness are prevention, awareness, response, and recovery – success in 
all four areas is required for preparedness efforts to be effective, according to Pelfrey. 
Although emergency management officials may engage in various prevention activities – 
protection, preemption, deterrence, and mitigation – these activities are more often the 
responsibility of law enforcement. Awareness, response, and recovery, however, concern 
emergency managers. For example, emergency managers are responsible for being 
aware of the early signs of a chemical or biological attack, responding to an emergency 
scene (i.e., containment, control, management of the incident, mitigation, and 
treatment), and recovery (i.e., rehabilitation, restoration, and repair).25 
Preparedness is also defined – and more commonly understood by the public – as an 
end-state. The assertion that “our organization is prepared for homeland security 
emergencies” connotes the end-state of meaning of preparedness. Pelfrey argues that 
the cycle framework is more appropriate for homeland security practitioners than the 
end-state framework because preparedness depends on “enactment” within an ever-
shifting social context. This study explores the government’s premise that homeland 
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security information sharing supports preparedness using both the end-state meaning 
of preparedness (tested in Hypothesis 1B above), as well as the four-part cycle of 
preparedness described by Pelfrey. The second phase of the preparedness cycle, 
“awareness,” is accounted for in Hypothesis 1A above. For reasons discussed below, 
information sharing is viewed here as contributing mainly to the first two phases of the 
preparedness cycle (prevention and awareness), with response and recovery capabilities 
being largely unrelated to the frequency of information-sharing system use. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 3A: Frequency of homeland security information-sharing system use 
will influence perceived ability to “prevent” homeland security emergencies.  
Hypothesis 3B: Frequency of homeland security information-sharing system use 
will have no significant influence on perceived ability to “respond” to homeland 
security emergencies. 
Hypothesis 3C: Frequency of homeland security information- sharing system use 
will have no significant influence on perceived ability to “recover” from homeland 
security emergencies.  
Studies by Brian J. Gerber et al. and Martin J. Zaworski underscored the ambiguous 
relationship between information sharing and preparedness.26 Gerber et al. tested the 
hypothesis that state-level government communication of threat information to 
municipal government agencies aids in preparedness action. This hypothesis was only 
partially supported. In one model, increasing state government communication of threat 
and other related information to municipal government actually decreased 
preparedness action. To account for this unexpected finding, the authors stated: “These 
… results can be viewed as coherent if one accepts this premise: Information sharing 
from state to municipal officials should matter on an issue of coordination [i.e., 
adopting new mutual aid agreements] but should matter less on whether a city is able to 
actually perform a [homeland security] plan test.”27 From this perspective, information 
sharing contributes to awareness and prevention, but it may not necessarily help in 
response and recovery efforts (Hypotheses 3B and 3C).  
Finally, in a study of whether automated information sharing helped law enforcement 
officers work better, Zaworksi found no significant difference in perceived effectiveness 
or performance between the group of officers that used automated information-sharing 
technology and the one that did not.28 Additionally, “There was no difference between 
[the group that used automated information sharing technology and the one that did 
not] in how they think [the technology] affects their productivity [and] essentially no 
difference between the two groups in how they saw the role of information sharing in 
making arrests.”29 Zaworksi stated: “Because [test group] officers have access to 
regional information and thus would seem to be better equipped to make arrests, this 
result was unexpected.”30 Zaworksi speculated that differing management climates 
within the control and test groups explained this result; but when combined with the 
findings from the studies mentioned above, taking another look at how homeland 
security information sharing relates to preparedness is warranted.  
 








This study involved two phases. In the first phase, a survey was administered to 
information-sharing system users to test hypothesized relationships between 
information sharing and preparedness. Support for the hypothesized relationships was 
generally weak; therefore, in the second phase of the study, interviews were conducted 
with homeland security, law enforcement, and emergency management officials to 
better understand how these officials made sense of the meanings of and 
interconnections between information sharing and preparedness.  
In Phase 1, an online survey was administered to LLIS.gov (Lessons Learned 
Information Sharing) members to understand their perceptions and practices 
concerning information sharing and preparedness. LLIS.gov is a national network 
linking emergency response providers and homeland security officials. LLIS.gov “seeks 
to improve preparedness nationwide by allowing local, state, and federal homeland 
security and response professionals to tap into a wealth of front-line expertise on the 
most effective planning, training, equipping, and operational practices for preventing, 
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from acts of terrorism.”31 To access 
LLIS.gov, one must generally be an emergency response provider, law enforcement 
official, or a homeland security official at the local, state, or federal level. 
LLIS.gov administrators permitted the posting of a twenty-seven-item survey on the 
homepage of the website, which was available to registered users from May 1, 2007 to 
May 15, 2007; 101 responses, eighty-three of which were mostly complete, were 
received. All responses were anonymous. The terms and conditions governing the use of 
LLIS.gov precluded random or stratified sampling techniques. In this study, the 
correlation coefficient and probability values for linear models containing two variables 
are reported. Results from this sample are likely not representative of the LLIS.gov user 
population. The sample may under-represent users who engage in information-sharing 
and preparedness activities yet are too busy to participate in an online survey. Certainly, 
such users might have answered survey questions differently than did the sample. As a 
result, findings from this study are not generalizable to the LLIS.gov population. 
Nevertheless, convenience sampling is often used in exploratory research, and the 
results can still provide important insights.32 
Because of the limitations of the survey, and the ambiguity surrounding conceptions 
of information sharing and preparedness, a second research phase was necessary. Phase 
2 involved interviews with information-sharing systems users from May 15 to August 3, 
2007. Interviews were semi-structured, and each lasted an average of forty minutes. 
Interview questions are provided in Appendix A. In general, interview themes were 
related to respondents’ attitudes, perceptions, and practices concerning information 
sharing and preparedness. A semi-structured approach permitted more detailed 
questions based on the interviewees’ responses. In other words, respondent interview 
techniques were used to: (1) elicit respondents’ understandings of “information 
sharing,” “preparedness,” and associated concepts; (2) identify the decisive elements of 
an expressed opinion concerning the relationship between these concepts; and (3) to 
determine what influenced this opinion.33 One administrator for a federal-level 
information-sharing system and nine LLIS.gov users scattered across the country were 
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interviewed, for a total of ten interviews. The nominal titles of the interview participants 
are listed in Appendix A. 
FINDINGS 
PHASE 1: SURVEY 
Appendix A lists several tables which provide descriptive information about the survey 
respondents. Respondents’ use of and perceptions about homeland security information 
sharing and associated systems, as well as an overview of the hypotheses and survey 
results are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Information Sharing and Preparedness Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis 1A. Frequency of homeland 
security information-sharing system use will 
influence “awareness” of homeland security 
threats. 
Respondents who use homeland security 
information-sharing system more frequently 
are significantly more likely to report being 
aware of homeland security threats. (r = .25, p 
= .022) 
Hypothesis 1B. Frequency of homeland 
security information-sharing system use will 
influence the perceived level of organizational 
preparedness (“end-state”). 
No significant association was found between 
participants’ frequency of information-sharing 
system use and perceived level of 
organizational preparedness (“end-state”). 
Hypothesis 2A. Level of perceived homeland 
security information quality will influence 
frequency of information-sharing system use. 
No significant association was found between 
perceived information quality and frequency of 
information-sharing system use.  
Hypothesis 2B. Level of perceived homeland 
security information quality will influence 
perceived level of job effectiveness.   
There is a significant positive relationship 
between homeland security information 
quality and perceived level of job 
effectiveness. (r = .23, p = .046) 
Hypothesis 3A. Frequency of homeland 
security information-sharing system use will 
influence perceived ability to “prevent” 
homeland security emergencies.  
No significant association was found between 
participants’ frequency of information-sharing 
system use and perceived ability to prevent 
homeland security emergencies.* 
Hypothesis 3B. Frequency of homeland 
security information-sharing system use will 
have no significant influence on perceived 
ability to “respond” to homeland security 
emergencies. 
No significant association was found between 
participants’ frequency of information-sharing 
system use and perceived ability to respond 
homeland security emergencies.  
Hypothesis 3C. Frequency of homeland 
security information-sharing system use will 
have no significant influence on perceived 
ability to “recover” from homeland security 
emergencies. 
No significant association was found between 
participants’ frequency of information-sharing 
system use and perceived ability to recover 
from homeland security emergencies. 
* Result requires explanation provided below.  
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As predicted, respondents who more frequently used homeland security information-
sharing systems were significantly more likely to report being aware of homeland 
security threats (r = .25, p = .022). However, frequency of use generally did not 
significantly correlate with the remaining three phases of the preparedness cycle 
described by Pelfrey (prevention, response, and recovery), nor did frequency of use 
significantly correlate with preparedness as an end-state. Respondents saw the use of 
LLIS.gov as overwhelmingly unhelpful in preventing homeland security emergencies 
(this finding is unsurprising when considering that LLIS.gov does not claim to provide 
“actionable” information); therefore, the use of LLIS.gov was disaggregated from “other 
information sharing systems” in order to determine whether those other systems (e.g., 
COPLINK, LEO, RISS) were perceived as being more helpful. When this disaggregation 
was performed, there was, in fact, a significant association between participants’ 
frequency of system use and perceived ability to prevent homeland security emergencies 
(r = .25, p = .026). Thus, all measures of preparedness with both the combined and 
disaggregated system-use variables were tested; prevention was the only measure where 
the results changed significantly.34  
Supporting studies within the information-systems success literature, there was a 
significant positive relationship between homeland security information quality and 
perceived level of job effectiveness (r = .23, p = .046). However, perceived information 
quality was not significantly correlated with information-sharing-system frequency of 
use. Frequency of use is a widely employed – but increasingly contested – variable in 
information systems research;35 therefore, the survey results were also analyzed using 
respondents’ overall opinion about the usefulness of information-sharing systems. 
There was no change in the results when opinion was substituted for frequency of use as 
an independent variable. In other words, those who held a more favorable opinion of 
information-sharing systems did not perceive themselves or their organizations to be 
significantly more (or less) prepared for homeland security emergencies than those who 
held a less favorable opinion. However, emergency managers (M = 4.71, SD = 1.15) were 
more likely than the other occupational subgroups (M = 3.98, SD = 1.46), such as law 
enforcement or public health personnel, to believe themselves to be prepared for 
homeland security threats when preparedness was defined as an end-state (t(81) = 2.08, 
p = .041). 
Overall, however, there is little evidence that increased information-sharing system 
use significantly increases perceived level of preparedness when preparedness is defined 
as an end-state. Nevertheless, there is some support for the premise that with more 
frequent use of information-sharing systems, users will tend to perceive themselves to 
be more aware of potential homeland security threats and perceive their organizations 
to be more capable of preventing homeland security emergencies. This finding 
reinforces Gerber et al.’s claim that information sharing contributes mainly to the first 
two phases of the preparedness cycle (prevention and awareness), while perceived 
improvements to response and recovery remain largely independent of information-
sharing efforts.36 Discussion with survey respondents would be needed, however, to 
adequately explain the dynamics of this situation.  
These results also suggest that one’s perceived level of job effectiveness tends to rise 
as the perceived quality of homeland security information increases. This finding 




HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 2 (MAY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
8 
reinforces and extends Zaworski’s conclusion that information “comprehensiveness” 
assists law enforcement officers in doing their jobs.37 This study suggests that other 
components of information quality (accuracy, timeliness, relevance, and consistency) 
are important for increasing perceived job effectiveness in a homeland security context. 
These results, however, say little about the meanings stakeholders give to the terms 
information sharing and preparedness. 
PHASE 2: INTERVIEWS 
The section above outlined the theoretical case for predicting a significant, causal 
relationship between information sharing and preparedness. While there were 
important limitations to the survey, as well as some indications of support for a handful 
of hypotheses, findings also affirmed the ambiguous and unexpected results of earlier 
empirical studies. What then accounts for the ambiguous relationship between 
information sharing and preparedness? A communication perspective helps to explain 
this ambiguity. Specifically, a communication perspective emphasizes the active role 
that audiences play in categorizing messages via pre-existing historical, cultural, and 
political frameworks, and evaluating those messages in terms of source credibility, 
intention, and trustworthiness.38 This perspective maintains that information sharing 
and preparedness are not objective phenomena with concrete properties and causal, 
law-like effects; rather they “are labels for the organized, institutional claim-making 
process which constitutes these phenomena.”39 In other words, information sharing and 
preparedness are the result of social processes through which groups assert and 
negotiate which objects, concepts, and practices represent those activities.40 A 
communication perspective makes sense for this study because it is important to 
understand how stakeholders construct the meanings of homeland security information 
sharing and preparedness and how they act in accordance with those meanings.  
Interview responses from ten homeland security, law enforcement, and emergency 
management officials suggest the following explanations: (1) definitions of information 
sharing and preparedness are contextually based, multiple, and at times conflicting, 
making the impact of information sharing difficult to ascertain;( 2) information received 
via these systems is usually vague, which constrains preparedness action; (3) 
information glut and associated responses dampen the influence of information sharing 
on preparedness; and (4) both information sharing and preparedness occur in the 
context of institutional norms that shape interpretations of message credibility, 
intention, and trustworthiness. 
The Problem of Definition 
No consensus definition of information sharing arose from the interview respondents. 
Instead, respondents offered an array of definitions for information sharing, many of 
which expressed dissatisfaction with current processes: 
Information sharing means a centralized area where you can grab stuff. 
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[Information sharing means] every little bit of information about everything that 
has to do with day-to-day crises to doom-and-gloom…all day, everyday, without 
filter.  
There’s a very fine line between information and shit, and I think what we see a lot 
of times is that everybody’s swapping shit.  
I don’t know, and that’s one of the problems I think we have right now.  
 
Several respondents also defined information sharing as a task that local officials are 
expected to do without much reciprocity from the federal level.  
Information sharing means a two-way street, but more often it’s a one-way street.  
[Information sharing] means information going to the JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task 
Force] and very little coming back. 
  
One law enforcement official explained the roots of his frustration with the “one-way 
street.” He stated that “the FBI has been horrible to work with. They’ve been a huge 
stumbling block.” This official explained that his city’s police department had discovered 
the name of a resident on a terrorist watch list. When he queried the FBI as to why this 
might be the case, the response he received was, “I can’t tell you.” The response was all 
the more frustrating because the FBI had earlier sponsored this official’s security 
clearance in order to facilitate information sharing. This official stated: “They [the FBI] 
have an elitist attitude. Of course, they’ll tell you differently. They come here and say 
‘we’re here to help’ and ‘we’ll share our information,’ but it’s all just smoke and mirrors. 
They want you to give them information so they can put it in a file somewhere.” 
Vague Information 
For the majority of respondents, vague information created significant obstacles to 
improving preparedness. Respondents commented on the quality of the homeland 
security information they received from federal-level systems.  
It’s all after-the-fact. There’s little value added.  
When it first came out, I was pretty active on LLIS, but then I thought: ‘Why am I 
doing this?’ 
It’s mostly useless. 
  
One respondent elaborated on how vague information constrains preparedness action:  
We’ll get a vague warning about threats to water treatment facilities, and there are 
several water treatment facilities in this area. The warning will be based on 
‘unconfirmed information.’ So I’m left wondering whether I should I go speak with 
the water treatment operators. I’ll call the FBI to get more information and they’ll 
say, ‘we don’t have any more information.’ I can’t get any specifics. There is just not 
enough detail for me to go to the city and request the money to harden those 
facilities. If I go to my chief with that information, he’s going to laugh at me.  
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Respondents explained that the types of information that would be useful for them in 
doing their jobs would include: 
Geographically-specific information and intelligence would be helpful instead of 
broad, general statements about threats.  
Specific information about suspects and bad guys.  
Actionable intelligence. This is something I need to know because it’s something I 
could or should react to.41  
 
Respondents universally valued interpersonal communication with their colleagues, 
finding it the most useful source of relevant information. One respondent explained: 
“The best source for information I get is from my contemporaries in other jurisdictions 
close by that I work with on a regular basis. We meet frequently and email frequently, 
[my colleagues provide] information that has been vetted and is of value.” The value 
officials placed on interpersonal communication likely stems from the opportunity it 
provides for officials to demonstrate their expertise, value, and influence, and to 
“bespeak their past and future competence.”42 Nevertheless, the government’s 
information-sharing strategy continues to emphasize impersonal electronic systems, 
databases, and alerts.  
Information Glut  
Information glut is a perennial problem in intelligence and national security-related 
organizations.43 The volume of information respondents typically receive has led some 
to simply delete or ignore much of it.  
If I didn’t have department to run it would be kind of fun to just sit at home and 
look at all this stuff.  
I can’t tell you how many passwords I have. They say, ‘Here’s the next thing. It’s a 
special thing for senior government officials, just log on.’ I don’t even do it 
anymore … I’ll look at them and there’s never been anything on there that’s of any 
value…. To be honest, I do this, and my guess is other people do it as well in my 
position, is that an awful lot of stuff gets deleted without ever being read…. If 
everything’s a priority, nothing’s a priority.  
 
Respondents emphasized the need for some sort of information “filter.” Whether state-
level fusion centers – the emerging linchpin in the government’s information-sharing 
strategy – can successfully fulfill that role is an open question. Some respondents 
recognized the value of the fusions centers, while others have not yet perceived any 
benefit.  
[Fusion centers] need to be staffed by more than just law enforcement … the all 
hazards approach has not been embraced by a lot of areas.  
We need people in leadership positions deciding what’s important.  
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What I’d prefer is a system where we recognize the sender as someone who has 
credibility and the information is not just something somebody’s sending to kind of 
cover their ass.  
We’re looking at getting a watch officer to distill this information down into a daily 
brief to help reduce some of the time spent reading stuff.   
 
Institutional Norms 
Institutional identities play a significant role in how information sharing is interpreted. 
Several local officials indicated that longstanding distrust of the federal bureaucracy has 
not waned in recent years.  
You’ve got all these hyper [federal-level] people bouncing around on their cell 
phones and Blackberries not paying attention to what’s going on because they’re all 
trying to share some shit so that they’re not the one blamed for not passing 
something on. 
There are a lot of people in Washington with word processors and a great 
imagination typing up more and more stuff that none of us have time to do 
anyway.  
 
Other officials, however, indicated a more positive relationship. “We’ve always had 
excellent working relationships with [federal officials],” stated one official. Several 
respondents also acknowledged that federal information sharing was hindered by 
antiquated classification rules and procedures the government is currently trying to 
address. As one official explained: 
Our law enforcement officials learned about a chlorine truck that needed to be 
tracked. Classification issues prevented the information from being shared with the 
fire department and emergency management organizations – but those are the 
agencies that have done the training and can best respond, so they need to know. 
By federal rules, they can’t share the information about the truck beyond law 
enforcement. It’s [still] an issue at this point. 
 
These examples suggest that the meaning of information sharing is constructed in 
reference to institutional identities and local organizational contexts. While many 
respondents acknowledged that in principle information sharing is vital to 
preparedness, several officials perceived current information-sharing initiatives as a way 
for federal officials to bridge the government’s post-9/11 (and Katrina) credibility gap 
with the public. The mocking tone of some of the responses highlighted above might, 
ideally, spur stakeholders to more critically examine current policies and practices. The 
issues identified by the respondents are certainly well known to many government 
officials. The government has responded to these challenges, in part, by seeking to foster 
“a culture of information sharing” within and among federal, state, and local agencies. 
The comments presented above indicate enduring friction points as the government 
attempts to change perceptions, align institutional subcultures, and alter information-
sharing practices. 








An assumption circulating within information sharing discourse is that the effectiveness 
of information sharing can be measured in terms of information flow, distribution, 
timeliness, coordination, and related system performance measures.44 The Information 
Sharing Environment’s [ISE] stated mission is to ensure the ability of agencies to share 
information – but just who is responsible for ensuring that such abilities to share 
information tangibly improve preparedness remains unclear. This study indicates that 
using system performance measures and capabilities to assess the effectiveness of 
information sharing is inadequate and potentially wasteful and misleading. As one local 
official in this study explained, “We’re in uncharted territory, with a lack of legal 
assistance, and a lack of leadership in some cases. [Information sharing is done] by a 
bunch of local people who all of a sudden have got millions of dollars pouring at them, 
and they’re trying to make the best use of it with limited guidelines. It’s been very 
challenging.” In developing metrics to assess the benefits of information sharing, 
officials must engage in the difficult task of relating system use to tangible 
improvements in preparedness. 
Information-sharing initiatives also unfold within varying budgetary constraints and 
divergent funding priorities. As a result, future research needs to address how financial 
and structural conditions influence information-sharing processes and practices. This 
study also suggests the need for comparative and longitudinal research of information 
sharing. However, future studies that attempt to construct concrete variables for 
hypothesis testing may similarly confront the contingency of the meanings of 
information sharing and preparedness. Although information sharing and preparedness 
are socially-defined concepts, their meanings can be mapped within different 
organizational contexts and across time using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Doing so can potentially assist policy makers and practitioners assess the 
utility of information-sharing strategies and the impact of associated organizational 
change efforts. Assessing whether the users of a given information-sharing system find 
the system valuable to preparedness efforts, as well as systematically explicating the 
features of highly useful systems, can aid in the their development. Additionally, a 
longitudinal approach would help assess how definitions of information sharing and 
preparedness, their associated practices, and stakeholder perceptions are changing over 
time.  
Finally, attempting to create a “trusted partnership” and a “culture of information 
sharing” in absence of clear, abundant evidence regarding how information sharing 
tangibly improves preparedness may ultimately undermine the government’s 
information-sharing strategy. This study highlighted local-level officials’ uncertainty 
regarding the effectiveness of current information-sharing processes. As one respondent 
concluded: “I hope somebody someplace has more information that they’re utilizing to 
protect the country because I’m not seeing a lot of stuff that’s of great value.” Given 
similar findings in recent reports, and the resources being dedicated to information 
sharing at all levels of government, further scrutiny of how information sharing relates 
to preparedness is warranted. This preliminary study has provided a modest step in that 
direction.  
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APPENDIX A – SELECTED SURVEY DATA 
Respondent Demographics (N=83)* 
 
Age  Gender  Education  
21-29 years 5% Male 71% Some college 11% 
30-39 years 16% Female  23% 2 year degree 6% 
1. 40-49 years 30% N/A 6% 4 year degree 17% 
2. 50+ years 45%   Some graduate 
credits 
19% 
N/A 5%   Master degree or 
higher 
42% 
    N/A 5% 
      
Occupation  Role  FEMA Region  
Emergency 
Mgmt. 
25% Management 48% I 5% 
Law Enforcement  18% Operations  18% II 8% 
Fire 5% Support  8% III 21% 
Public Health 12% Other 19% IV 11% 
Other 31%   V 11% 
N/A 8%   VI 12% 
    VII 6% 
    VIII 4% 
    IX 12% 
    X 4% 
 
* Some categories do not total 100% due to some respondents not providing an answer.  
 
Source from Which Most Often Receive Homeland Security Information 
(N=83) 
Homeland security email / bulletins / alerts  34 
Face-to-face meetings with colleagues 5 
Email or telephone calls with colleagues 17 
Newspapers / magazines 5 
Radio 1 
Television  2 













Most Frequently Used Homeland Security Information Sharing Systems  
 
COPLINK, HSIN (Homeland Security Information Network), InfraGard, Intelink, 
LEO (Law Enforcement Online), LLIS (Lessons Learned Information Sharing), 
RISS (Regional Information Sharing Systems) 
 
Frequency of Homeland Security Information Sharing Systems Use 
(N=83) 
 LLIS Other Systems 
Less than once per month 16% 35% 
Monthly 48% 22% 
Weekly 34% 31% 
Daily 2% 12% 
 
Survey Questions Related to Preparedness  
 
In your opinion, how prepared is your organization for homeland security 
threats in your region? (preparedness as an “end-state”) 
In your opinion, how aware are you personally of homeland security threats 
facing your region? 
In your opinion, how aware is your organization of homeland security threats 
facing your region? 
In your opinion, how prepared is your organization to prevent a homeland 
security emergency in your region? 
In your opinion, how prepared is your organization to respond to a homeland 
security emergency in your region? 
In your opinion, how prepared is your organization to recover from a homeland 
security emergency in your region? 
 
Interview Participants (Nominal Titles) 
 
Administrator, Federal-level Information Sharing System 
Assistant Coordinator, County Office of Emergency Management 
Assistant General Manager, City Emergency Preparedness Department 
Coordinator, Regional Homeland Security  
Detective 
Director of Municipal Information Sharing System 
Director of Public Safety, County-level  
Director, City Office of Emergency Management 
Director, County Department of Emergency Services  
Intelligence Detective 
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The Application of Cost Management and Life-Cycle Cost Theory 
to Homeland Security National Priorities 
Robert Hall and Erica Dusenberry Dimitrov 
 
As the nation’s homeland security environment develops and evolves, federal, state, 
tribal, and local partners must continually implement and adapt homeland security 
programs that address both national and local homeland security priorities, while 
simultaneously managing the costs and resources necessary to maintain an adequate 
level of preparedness. Without a flexible, logical, and transparent method of managing 
homeland security costs and programs, homeland security leaders are faced with a 
daunting task. This article proposes life-cycle cost (LCC) theory as a method to identify 
and quantify the costs of achieving and sustaining preparedness capabilities across the 
nation.   
The purpose of this article is threefold. First, it documents a methodology that uses 
LCC theory to quantify the costs of achieving and sustaining target capabilities to 
support the National Preparedness System. Second, as an example case, the article 
applies the methodology to the Explosive Device Response Operations (EDRO) target 
capability, which is the capability to coordinate, direct, and conduct improvised 
explosive device (IED) response after initial alert and notification. We chose to 
exemplify the application of LCC methodology using the EDRO capability because this 
particular capability includes a complex structure with many cost components. As such 
the example provides a robust overview of the methodology.  Third, it articulates a 
number of next steps needed to develop and apply LCC methods to national 
preparedness. 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the Interim 
National Preparedness Goal. In September 2007, DHS published the National 
Preparedness Guidelines, which finalized the development of the national goal. The goal 
describes the following national preparedness system vision: A nation prepared with 
coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all 
hazards in a way that balances risk with resources and need.1 
To support the preparedness system vision, DHS created a conceptual framework to 
build, sustain, and improve national preparedness for a broad range of natural, man-
made, and technological threats and hazards within the following four mission areas: 
prevent, protect, respond, and recover.2 A collection of aggregate capabilities outlines 
the homeland security tasks associated with each mission area. Each capability 
integrates multiple disciplines, processes, and procedures through a method detailing 
the conditions under which tasks take place and describing desired outcomes. The 
collection of these capabilities comprises the Target Capabilities List (TCL).   
The TCL is a generic model of operationally ready capabilities that define 
preparedness for all types of hazards.  Target Capabilities List 2.0 describes the amount 
of capability a jurisdiction must achieve in (1) planning factors, which provide estimates 
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of the amount of a capability necessary to address a specific scenario and (2) national 
target levels, which provide estimates of the amount of a capability needed across the 
nation to achieve national preparedness.3 The next iteration of the TCL, 3.0, will 
describe the level of capabilities a jurisdiction must achieve in terms of performance 
class, performance objective, and capability element frameworks.4  
As DHS policy has matured over the last several years, the importance of quantifying 
levels and costs of capabilities has gained importance. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reports have emphasized the need to determine capability costs, determine 
what governments can afford, establish capability baselines, develop coordinated 
funding plans and expenditures, and develop life-cycle cost practices.5 For the federal 
government, this will require that homeland security program analysts quantify, in 
some way, the costs associated with achieving and sustaining the target levels of 
capability that make the nation fully prepared.  For state, tribal, and local governments, 
this will require that homeland security program managers determine the levels of 
capability a jurisdiction needs and associated costs so that they can take full advantage 
of grant programs and effectively manage homeland security programs within their 
jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, as mandates like the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (which requires 
states to report an estimate of homeland-security related expenditures for each prior 
and current fiscal year) and the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
(which requires states to report homeland security preparedness levels in annual State 
Preparedness Reports) take hold, the calculation of capability cost will need to be more 
than an opinion. Potentially, there may be many ways to calculate the cost of 
preparedness. We propose a thorough and robust method of calculation that determines 
the components of people, planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise 
that make up a capability; identifies, models, and annualizes component costs; and 
calculates costs for accomplishing and sustaining national target-levels of capability. 
COST MANAGEMENT 
Developing and maintaining viable homeland security programs within states and 
jurisdictions requires federal, state, tribal, and local officials to understand the costs 
involved in acquiring and sustaining programs associated with national priorities. With 
fifty-six states and territories and approximately sixty urban areas executing homeland 
security programs under differing strategies with a multitude of goals and objectives, the 
cost-management process is extremely complex.6 However, modern cost-management 
methods used by industry and federal agencies such as the Department of Defense7 can 
provide insight and permit the Department of Homeland Security to mature cost-
management practices while avoiding “unprofitable” pitfalls.8 
Cost management helps managers plan and control expenditures by providing 
managers and designers with better information on when and where costs occur and 
what costs add to the value of a product.9 Further, the development of cost-analysis 
techniques can provide insight on the return-on-investment of federal grant programs, 
such as the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). Applying modern cost-
management methods to homeland security cost management requires homeland 
security project managers to focus on four major concepts: 
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1.  Expand existing views of capability cost beyond the purchase of new equipment to 
achieving and sustaining an entire target capability through long-term programs in 
states and urban areas.  
2.  Develop capability cost estimates by detailing capability components and their cost 
variables and developing a model for each target capability element.   
3.  Determine the most expensive components (cost drivers) of a capability to balance 
limited resources and needs.  
4.  Calculate the target capability-element level that must be achieved to comply with 
capability planning factors and national target levels so that costs are quantified and 
risk-benefit analysis is possible. 
LCC AS A METHOD FOR COST MANAGEMENT  
Life-cycle cost (LCC) is a methodology that can assist cost management efforts by 
calculating the ‘total’ cost of owning an asset.10 Total cost includes the cost to not only 
acquire the asset, but also to use, maintain, rehabilitate, and replace it. While the 
uncertainty and dynamic nature of many sectors in our society introduce challenges to 
identifying and maintaining accurate long-term cost projections,11 LCC methodology 
continues to become an increasingly popular method of cost management and financial 
planning as society more frequently demands greater accountability and cost 
effectiveness, noticeable return-on-investment, and defendable justifications for asset 
acquisition. For example, the public works,12 public and private contracting,13 and 
construction14 industries have begun relying on LCC methodology to inform marketing, 
acquisition, procurement, and project justification activities. 
LCC methodology has proven to be useful in a wide range of environments, including 
manufacturing and the management of government acquisition programs. For example, 
by identifying and modeling the many costs incurred in the manufacturing industry 
(e.g., equipment maintenance, production quality and rework, and de-manufacturing 
and recycling costs), LCC theory allows engineers to optimize the production process, 
reduce costs, and increase product quality.15 Likewise, LCC models that capture 
operating and support costs, in addition to acquisition costs, allow the Department of 
Defense to make sound and informed investments.16  
The success that LCC methodology has brought to these environments also may be 
recognized in the homeland security sector. Specifically, of the many cost-management 
methods that may be used to calculate homeland security costs,17 LCC is promising in its 
ability to model the costs that states, tribal entities, and urban areas incur to achieve a 
particular level of capability and then sustain it. The ability of LCC methods to expand 
project management beyond a focus on initial acquisition costs to operations and 
support cost considerations can lead to more successful homeland security programs.  
Specifically, the goal of using LCC methods is to help states, tribal entities, and urban 
areas forecast target capability costs and make decisions on when investments are 
needed and at what amount. When the resource needs of a jurisdiction align well to the 
Target Capabilities List planning factors and target levels, the standardization offered by 
LCC cost models can facilitate planning and serve as example investment strategies.  
Standardization is certainly useful in aggregating cost at the state and federal level to 
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calculate preparedness cost estimates. When the resource needs of a jurisdiction do not 
align well to the TCL, the models may be adapted to specific jurisdictional needs and 
continue to provide insight into local costs.   
At local, state, and federal levels LCC methods make it possible to forecast annual 
support and replacement costs for homeland security programs, distribute investments 
to cover these costs over their lifetime, and establish viable long-term procurement 
strategies that acquire only the equipment and personnel supportable within a defined 
budget. LCC estimates also determine which operational components cost the most and 
help influence strategies to manage these cost drivers.   
LCC METHODOLOGY 
LCC methodology provides states, tribal entities, urban areas, and local jurisdictions 
with estimates of the acquisition cost as well as the steady-state costs of maintaining a 
specific target capability or national priority over time. We implement the methodology 
using a flexible and transparent spreadsheet model consisting of the operational units 
(elements) of a capability and the costs associated with their individual parts, or 
components (e.g., people, equipment, and training). The model is flexible because cost 
variables and capability components are easily modified based on stakeholder feedback 
and data. The model is transparent because it is implemented in a way that permits 
stakeholders to understand its presentation in a spreadsheet. Figure 1 includes the key 
terminology of the methodology and an explanation of how different terms relate.  
  
Figure 1: Key terminology of the LCC method 
Capability A specific aptitude to protect against, prevent, respond to or recover 
from an incident or hazard.  A capability is comprised of elements. 
Elements Groupings of people, planning, equipment, training, and exercise 
resources into units that are employed in an operational fashion. An 
element is comprised of components. 
Components  Individual people, planning, organization and leadership activities, 
equipment, training, and exercises.  Each component is associated with 
a cost variable.  
Cost 
Variables 
Categories that capture the specific dollar amounts to procure and 
sustain individual components. 
Cost model A spreadsheet that calculates the total cost to acquire and sustain a 
capability.  A cost model contains all of the cost variable, component, 
and element data for a given capability. 
 
Our implementation of the methodology follows the six steps listed here and explained 
in the following paragraphs.   
1.  Determine the capability elements  
2.  Identify and characterize capability components  
3.  Develop LCC variables for each component  
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4.  Develop a cost model  
5.  Annualize the cost model and identify cost drivers  
6.  Link the model to national targets and assigned levels  
Step 1: Determine the Capability Elements 
The first step requires the identification of capability elements. We use element to mean 
a grouping of people, planning, organization and leadership, equipment, training, and 
exercise resources into a unit that is employed in an operational fashion.  
Every national priority and target capability integrates multiple elements, which 
collectively represent the resources required to perform critical tasks associated with the 
capability.18 For example, an element in the Explosive Device Response Operations 
(EDRO) capability would be a bomb team (Type I, II, or III). The DHS Target 
Capabilities List is a good reference for learning what elements are in a capability.  The 
TCL lists the capability elements for each of the thirty-seven target capabilities. 
Step 2: Identify and Categorize Capability Components 
Once capability elements are identified, we further categorize the components of each 
element. Components include the people, planning, organization and leadership 
activities, equipment, training, and exercises that make up a capability element. To 
identify capability components, we use the TCL, advice from advisory groups and 
subject matter experts, and existing standards (e.g., resource typing). While 
consideration of component standards and requirements in national doctrine such as 
the TCL is of obvious import, we recognize that certain on-site circumstances (e.g. 
competing priorities, limited funding, or lack of political support) may alter component 
configurations from those expected. As such, consultation with advisory groups and 
subject matter experts allows us to validate the components included in our LCC 
models. Federal, state, tribal, and local users of LCC methodology have similar flexibility 
to create models that include only the components necessary for their jurisdiction’s 
specific needs or requirements.  
Step 3: Develop LCC Cost Variables 
To accommodate the life-cycle of target capabilities, we use five LCC cost variables to 
capture and categorize the individual acquisition and sustainment costs of capability 
components. These cost variables and some example costs are shown in Figure 2. To 
determine individual component costs, we use the Responder Knowledge Base, which is 
a database that provides emergency responders, purchasers, and planners with a 
trusted, integrated, online source of information on products, standards, certifications, 
grants, and other equipment-related information.19 We also reference information 
gathered from vendor data, published salaries and backfill costs, advisory groups, 
training program guides, and subject matter experts. Depending on the user, these costs 
may represent exact figures, such as when a program manager is using LCC 
methodology to demonstrate current and future budget expenditures, or industry 
averages, such as when a new program manager is attempting to identify the long-term 
costs of potential investments. 
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It is important to note that not all components have costs associated with all five LCC 
cost variables. For example, a piece of equipment that cannot be upgraded does not have 
an upgrade cost. Further, for assets that are shared between jurisdictions, users may 
include only the costs that they actually contribute to the resource. 
Step 4: Develop a Cost Model 
All LCC cost variables must be analyzed collectively to see how they contribute to the 
total cost of the capability element. A cost model, in the form of a spreadsheet, is an 
effective way to display the cost composition of a capability element. Thus, we create a 
spreadsheet that calculates the cost of individual capability elements and aggregates 
these costs to provide the total cost associated with an entire capability. Figure 3 
provides an example of a LCC model for a Type I bomb team.   
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Type I Bomb Team
Quantity Comp Cost 1 Initial 2 Energy 3 Operating 4 Repair 5 Upgrade Shelf Life
1 $225,000.00 $225,000.00 $4,320.00 $1,200.00 $1,800.00 $0.00 15
1 $2,500.00 $2,500.00 $60.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 15
1 $8,890.00 $8,890.00 $162.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 10
1 $173,000.00 $173,000.00 $100.00 $0.00 $1,300.00 $4,000.00 15
0 $93,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 15
1 $8,670.00 $8,670.00 $71.00 $0.00 $100.00 $0.00 5
1 $465.00 $465.00 $10.00 $0.00 $50.00 $0.00 10
2 $396.00 $792.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 15
2 $885.00 $1,770.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5
2 $720.00 $1,440.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 3
1 $279,000.00 $279,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 $240.00 $0.00 15
1 $4,690.00 $4,690.00 $200.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 15
1 $300.00 $300.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5
1 $5,000.00 $5,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5
1 $15,000.00 $15,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5
1 $2,600.00 $2,600.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5
1 $1,340.00 $1,340.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 15
1 $8,130.00 $8,130.00 $0.00 $0.00 $500.00 $0.00 10
1 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $5,000.00 $0.00 $0.00 1
1 $6,550.00 $6,550.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5
1 $29,500.00 $29,500.00 $0.00 $0.00 $250.00 $0.00 10
1 $14,100.00 $14,100.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 3
2 $955.00 $1,910.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 5
2 $4,800.00 $9,600.00 $0.00 $0.00 $100.00 $0.00 5
2 $35.00 $70.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 3
2 $87,500.00 $175,000.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 $4,000.00 $8,000.00 $19,800.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 $1,650.00 $0.00 $3,300.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 $990.00 $0.00 $1,980.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 $990.00 $0.00 $1,980.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 $9,900.00 $0.00 $19,800.00 N/A N/A N/A N/A
2 $1,650.00 $0.00 $3,300.00 N/A N/A N/A N/ARobot Operator's Course
Item Description
Bomb Technician
Basic Hazardous Devices School (6-week)
Recertification (1-week)
LE Response to WMD - Operations level (24 hrs)
WMD HazMat Techician Training (24 hrs)
Post Blast Investigation Training (6-week)
Suit, "Search", Improvised Explosive Device/Explosive Ordnance Disposal (IED/EOD) Protective Ensemble
X-Ray Unit, Portable or Transportable
Hardware, Computer, Integrated
EOD Body Cooling System
SCBA 30, 45, 60 Min. & Rebreathers
Undergarment, Non-Flame-Resistant (cotton)
Equipment, Head and Face Protection, IED/EOD
EOD Bomb Suit
EOD Comm System
EOD Tech Tool Kit
Kit, Fiber Optic (not required)
Team Supplies (per year)
Ballistic Helmets
Body Armor (TEV)
Clothing, Operational, and Specialized/Protective Gear IED/EOD (charcoal undergarment)
CBRNE Containment Vessel
Disruptor, Pan (with expendable rounds)
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Step 5: Annualize the Cost Model and Identify Cost Drivers 
We annualize the cost calculated in Step 4 to provide states, tribal entities, and urban 
areas with cost estimates that can support the development of long-term program and 
project plans. Not all costs, however, are incurred on an annual basis. For example, the 
initial cost of a piece of equipment or the cost to attend a training session tend to be 
one-time investments, only to be incurred again when equipment needs to be replaced 
or there is personnel turnover. Energy, operating, and repair costs, however, are 
traditionally presented in an annual format.  
Thus, to allow an annualized assessment of capability costs, our methodology 
requires the creation of an additional cost variable to represent the annual depreciation, 
or replacement cost (R-Cost), of a component. The replacement-cost variable can be 
thought of as a replacement-cost reserve that builds to permit the purchase of new 
equipment as old equipment wears out. Our replacement cost assumes a zero percent 
discount rate. The need for a discount rate depends on the use of the analysis. In 
matters where cost comparisons are made on a year-by-year basis, a discount rate is of 
limited use.  
For equipment components, we obtain this replacement cost by dividing the initial 
equipment cost by the equipment’s expected life span (service life). In the case of 
personnel components, the replacement cost reserve may fund the hiring or training of 
new personnel once existing personnel move on. To calculate the replacement cost of 
training, we divide initial training cost by anticipated duration of employment. To 
complete this calculation, we make the assumption that people do not stay at their jobs 
indefinitely. Our past LCC analyses assume a nine-year service period for personnel. To 
follow that methodology as closely as possible, we make the same assumption in this 
article.   
Annualized cost models offer an understanding of how multiple components of a 
capability might fit into a budget and which components are most costly. The cost 
information from this type of analysis can support the following activities:  
1. Sequence and/or limit the purchase of the most costly equipment to ensure that 
funds are available to maintain and upgrade existing equipment.  
2. Stagger large purchases by making equally spaced investments determined by the 
equipment service life, establish equipment rotations, and avoid periods when all 
equipment becomes unserviceable at the same time.  
3. Determine what capability level is affordable and what additional capability should 
be acquired through mutual aid. 
Step 6: Link the Model to National Targets  
Finally, our methodology links element costs to national target and assigned capability 
levels (provided by the Target Capabilities List or subject matter experts) to quantify the 
cost of maintaining a jurisdictional preparedness level for an entire target capability.  
National target levels are derived from the National Planning Scenarios and were 
developed through stakeholder working groups. The national target level is the amount 
of capability required throughout the country to accomplish mission area tasks during a 
major event. It is anticipated that most jurisdictions will not locally sustain national 
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target levels of capability for a major event, but contribute some capability elements to 
the national target levels and achieve the remainder of the capability through mutual aid 
agreements.20  
ANALYSIS OF THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE RESPONSE OPERATIONS (EDRO) TARGET 
CAPABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE LCC METHODS 
To demonstrate the application of the LCC methodology to a capability, this section 
discusses our LCC analysis of the Explosive Device Response Operations (EDRO) target 
capability.21 According to the Target Capabilities List, EDRO is the capability to 
coordinate, direct, and conduct an improvised explosive device (IED) response after 
initial alert and notification. The critical tasks associated with the EDRO capability, such 
as intelligence fusion and analysis, the implementation of render-safe procedures, and 
the conduct of searches for additional explosive devices, are accomplished by a bomb 
squad that is able to dispatch bomb teams to the incident site.22 A bomb squad is a 
bomb response organization, consisting of at least one bomb team, accredited by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations Hazardous Devices School, and compliant with the 
standards set by National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB).  
Dispatch of one or more bomb teams may be due to a wide range of incidents and 
emergencies, and may involve chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive 
(CBRNE) materials.  A bomb team is a sub-unit within a bomb squad consisting of at 
least two certified bomb technicians and a complete set of standardized equipment that 
varies depending on the type of bomb team.  The ‘type’ or capacity of a bomb team for a 
specific incident is dependent on the response requirements of the incident and the 
training and experience required of personnel. The FEMA Typed Resources Definitions 
outline the characteristics of three bomb team types. This section highlights key points 
in applying our LCC methodology to the EDRO target capability.  
EDRO Step 1: Determine Explosive Device Response Operations Elements  
The Explosive Device Response Operations capability is team-based, which means that 
the tasks performed within the capability are conducted by members of an easily 
identified team. All EDRO capability costs are incurred to support National Bomb Squad 
Commanders Advisory Board accredited bomb squads, which are composed of one or 
more bomb teams that vary in type and qualification. As a result, we identified the 
EDRO capability elements as Type I, Type II, and Type III National Bomb Squad 
Commanders Advisory Board-accredited bomb teams. Figure 4 displays some of the 
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Figure 4: Qualifications of National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory  
Board accredited bomb teams 
 
Type I Bomb Team Type II Bomb Team Type III Bomb Team 
Handles multiple 
simultaneous incidents 
Handles multiple incidents Handles single incidents 
Possesses large robotic 
vehicle 
Possesses small robotic 
vehicle 
Does not possess a robotic 
vehicle 
Able to work in a CBRNE 
environment 
Trained and equipped to work 
in a CBRNE environment 
Trained, but not equipped to 
work in a CBRNE 
environment 
EDRO Step 2: Identify and Categorize Explosive Device Response 
Operations Components 
Bomb team composition is modeled based on the FEMA Typed Resource Definitions. 
While these resource definitions were helpful in providing general information on the 
composition of teams, we required more detailed information on each equipment, 
personnel, and training component of the teams. Therefore, we worked with the 
National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board Equipment Subcommittee to obtain 
greater specificity in bomb squad and ultimately bomb team composition. Additionally, 
we identified each equipment component location in the FEMA National Preparedness 
Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, Responder Knowledge Base, Authorized 
Equipment List (AEL), which is a generic list of equipment items that may be purchased 
using federal grant funds.23  
Our research resulted in the identification of twenty-four equipment, one personnel, 
and six training components for a bomb team. We also recognized that equipment 
configuration may vary depending on the bomb team type. For instance, a Type I bomb 
team possesses a large robot, a Type II bomb team possesses a small robot, and a Type 
III bomb team does not possess a robot. As such, we created a separate cost model for 
each bomb team type, which is discussed in the Explosive Devise Response Operations 
Step 4 below. Figure 5 details the equipment, personnel, and training components for a 
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Figure 5: Type I bomb team components 
Equipment Components 
EOD Response Vehicle EOD Bomb Suit 
Optics, Thermal imaging and/or Light 
Amplification 
EOC Communications System 
Robot, Large EOD Tech Tool Kit 
Robot, Small Kit, Fiber optic 
Chemical Agent Monitor Team supplies, per year 
Personal Radiation Detector Suit, “search”, IED/EOD 
Ballistic Helmets X-ray Unit, portable or transportable 
Body Armor (TEV) Hardware, computer integrated 
Clothing, Operational, and 
Specialized/Protective Gear IED 
EOD Body Cooling System 
CBRNE Containment Vessel SCBA 30, 45, 60 min. & rebreathers 
Disruptor, Pan (with expendable rounds) Undergarment, non-flame-resistant (cotton) 





Basic Hazardous Devices School (6-week) WMD HazMat Technician Training (24 
hours) 
Recertification (1-week) Post Blast Investigation Training (6-week) 
LE Response to WMD – Operations level (24 
hours) 
Robot Operator’s Course 
 
EDRO Step 3: Develop LCC Cost Variables 
We identified the following cost variables for each bomb team component (see Figure 
6). 
 
Figure 6:  LCC cost variables by bomb team component 
 
  
Equipment    Personnel   Training 
 Acquisition Costs  Acquisition Costs  Acquisition Costs 
  Initial         Salary        Backfill Costs 
 Sustaining Costs            Costs to Attend Training 
  Energy 
  Operating 
  Repair 
  Upgrade 
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EDRO Step 4: Develop a Cost Model 
We utilized the Explosive Device Response Operations components and the LCC cost 
variables identified in the previous steps to form the framework of the cost models for 
the three bomb team types. Figure 7 provides an example of the information included in 
the cost models.  
 




Costs Sustainment Costs 
Item Description Quantity Initial Energy Operating Repair Upgrade 
EOD Response Vehicle 1 $225,000 $4,320 $1,200 $1,800 $0 
Binoculars 1 $2,500 $60 $0 $0 $0 
Optics, Thermal imaging  1 $8,890 $162 $0, $$0 $0 





Item Description Quantity Salary      
Bomb Technician 2 $175, 000 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Training  Acquisition Costs Sustainment Costs 
Item Description Quantity Cost attend Backfill    
Basic Hazardous Devices School  2 $8,000 $19,800 N/A N/A N/A 
Recertification  2 $0 $3,300 N/A N/A  N/A 
LE Response to WMD – Ops Level 1 2 $0 $1,980 N/A N/A N/A 
Costs rounded to the nearest tens digit. 
 
 
EDRO Step 5: Annualize the Cost Model  
We annualized the bomb team costs to provide jurisdictions with an understanding of 
annual costs to sustain a bomb team. Figure 8 provides an example of the information 
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Figure 8: Sample annualized LCC model information: Type I bomb team, equipment  
Item Description Initial R-Cost Energy Operating Repair Upgrade Annual 
Service 
Life 
EOD Response Vehicle $225,000 $15,000 $4,320 $1,200 $1,800 $0 $22,300 15 
Binoculars $2,500 $170 $60 $0 $0 $0 $230 15 
Optics, Thermal Imaging  $8,890 $890 $160 $0, $$0 $0 $1,050 10 
Robot, Large $173,000 $11,530 $100 $0 $1,300 $4,000 $16,930 15 
Robot, Small $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 15 
Chemical Agent Monitor $8,670 $1,730 $70 $0 $100 $0 $1,900 5 
Personal Radiation Detector $465 $50 $10 $0 $50 $0 $110 15 
Ballistic Helmets $792 $50 $0 $0 $0 $0 $50 10 
Body Armor (TEV) $1,770 $350 $0 $0 $0 $0 $350 5 
Operational/Protective Gear  $1,440 $480 $0 $0 $0 $0 $480 3 
CBRNE Containment Vessel $279,000 $18,600 $0 $0 $240 $0 $18,840 15 
Disruptor, Pan $4,690 $310 $200 $0 $0 $0 $510 15 
Hand Protection $300 $60 $0 $0 $0 $0 $60 5 
Head and Face Protection $5,000 $1,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $1,000 5 
EOD Bomb Suit $15,000 $3,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $3,000 5 
EOC Communications System $2,600 $520 $0 $0 $0 $0 $520 5 
EOD Tech Tool Kit $1,340 $90 $0 $0 $0 $0 $90 15 
Kit, Fiber Optic $8,130 $810 $0 $0 $500 $0 $1,350 10 
Team Supplies, per Year $0 $0 $0 $5,000 $0 $0 $5,000 1 
Suit, “Search,” IED/EOD $6,550 $1,310 $0 $0 $0 $0 $1,310 5 
X-Ray Unit $29,500 $2,950 $0 $0 $250 $0 $3,200 10 
Hardware, Computer Integrated $14,100 $4,700 $0 $0 $0 $0 $4,700 3 
EOD Body Cooling System $1,910 $380 $0 $0 $0 $0 $380 5 
SCBA 30, 45, 60 m. Rebreathers $9,600 $1,920 $0 $0 $100 $0 $2,020 5 
Undergarment (Cotton) $70 $20 $0 $0 $0 $0 $20 3 
 
In the case of equipment, the component annual cost represents the sum of the 
annualized replacement cost, and all other costs incurred annually (energy, operating, 
repair, and upgrade costs). The annual equipment cost for the Type I bomb team shown 
in Figure 5 is $85,400. Equipment cost drivers are those components that annually cost 
the most. In the Type I bomb team the obvious components are the response vehicle, 
containment vessel, and bomb robot ($22,300, $18,840, and $16,930 respectively).  
Less obvious components are the team supplies and integrated computer with lower 
initial costs, but more frequent replacement costs ($5,000 and $4,700 respectively). 
Personnel costs are annual costs that vary widely throughout the country.  However, a 
reasonable cost estimate based on a median patrol officer salary ($50,000) and a 
business cost ratio of 1.75 (to account for overhead) resulted in an annual cost of 
$87,500 per person. The $50,000 median patrol officer salary is based on an average of 
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median salaries reported by several web-based salary resources,24 and we assume the 
1.75 business cost ratio is a reasonable estimate for the security industry. 
We based our annual training calculation on the assumption that a bomb team 
member receives all necessary training and stays on the bomb squad for nine years. 
Training costs include the cost of attending the Basic Hazardous Devices School and 
backfill costs for the Basic Hazardous Devices School and all other training courses, 
which are provided at no cost. Assuming the $41.25 average backfill cost for a law 
enforcement official reported in the DHS 2003 and 2004 State Homeland Security 
Assessment and Strategy Program and the average bomb technician remaining in the 
position for nine years, we estimated the annualized cost of training to be $3,600 per 
person.  
Multiplying the personnel ($87,500) and training ($3,600) costs by two, to account 
for the two bomb technicians on a Type I bomb team, and adding all component annual 
costs ($85,400) reveals that the total annual cost to maintain the Type I bomb team is 
$267,600.  
EDRO Step 6: Link the Model to National Targets  
The final step of our LCC methodology is to calculate the target capability element level 
that must be achieved nationally to comply with capability planning factors and national 
target levels. According to the Target Capabilities List, national target levels call for 458 
accredited bomb squads in the U.S.  
Interestingly, the FEMA Typed Resources Definitions that we used when developing 
our models specifies equipment, personnel, and training components for a bomb team, 
not a bomb squad. Thus, we had a disconnect between the resource typing standard we 
used as the foundation for our cost models and the national target level as described by 
the Target Capabilities List. Therefore, we needed to create a bomb-teams-to-squad 
relationship for the EDRO capability. 
To develop this relationship, we used population tiers to describe the number and 
type of bomb teams needed by a bomb squad for a certain jurisdictional population size. 
We developed this relationship first by using a capabilities-based threat assessment 
method described by Thomas Goss25 and then validating that relationship through 
analysis of interview data on twenty-three bomb squads of various-sized jurisdictions. 
Figure 9 shows our results in the number and type of bomb teams possessed by bomb 
squads in jurisdictions of various sizes. 
 
Figure 9: Number and type of bomb teams required of jurisdictions of various sizes 
Jurisdiction size Type I  Type II Type III 
Total population under 117,000 0 0 1 
Total population from 117,000 to 300,000 1 0 0 
Total population from 300,000 to 1,000,000 2 1 0 
Total population greater than 1,000,000 3 0 2 
 
Based on these criteria, a jurisdiction with a total population of 500,000 would, on 
average, achieve and sustain an EDRO capability consisting of two Type I bomb teams, 
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at a cost of $267,600 per team per year and one Type II bomb team, at a cost of 
$249,900 for a total cost of $785,100 per year. 
CONCLUSION   
In applying LCC methods to the Explosive Device Response Operations capability, we 
built models that used a lot of detailed information to capture capability components, 
their costs, and target levels. This level of detail is precisely what is needed by local, 
tribal, state, and federal officials to accurately determine how resources contribute 
toward achieving and sustaining local and national preparedness. 
In managing the cost of homeland security grant programs, we believe it is important 
to know whether funding is used by a state or local jurisdiction to hire people or to 
purchase planning, organization and leadership, equipment, training, or exercise 
resources. But, we assume it is equally important to know how target levels of capability 
are achieved and how much it will cost to sustain target levels of capability in the future.  
Life -cycle cost methods and capability modeling can be used to provide this necessary 
information.   
To further the development and application of the LCC methodology, we recommend 
the following: 
1. Focusing on capabilities aligned to the national priorities in the National 
Preparedness Guidelines.   
2. Conducting a national-level LCC analysis for each national priority capability. 
3. Creating and sharing prototype tools with jurisdictions to facilitate use of this 
methodology. 
4. Creating a central Web-enabled database to share cost models among jurisdictions. 
5. Incorporating LCC tools into future grant management systems for use by state and 
local jurisdictions. 
Cost analysis will be vital to achieving and sustaining target levels of capability, 
particularly in helping make difficult resource allocation decisions across coordinated 
capability needs. As risk-assessment efforts identify those risks posing the greatest 
danger to homeland security, it will be necessary to ensure we can achieve, sustain, and 
afford the capabilities that target the right risks. 
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